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The slogans are ubiquitous: “Only ‘Yes’ Means ‘Yes’”; “Got Consent?”; 
“Consent is Hot, Assault is Not!” Clear consent is the rule, but the meaning of sexual 
consent is far from clear. The current state of confusion is evident in the numerous 
competing views about what constitutes mental agreement (grudging acceptance or 
eager desire?) and what comprises performative consent (passive acquiescence or an 
enthusiastic “yes”?). This paper seeks to clear up the consent confusion. It charts the 
contours of the sexual consent framework, categorizes different definitions of 
affirmative consent, and critically describes arguments for and against affirmative 
consent. Today’s widespread uncertainty is partly a product of the affirmative 
consent reform juggernaut and its rapid legal changes. Confusion is also connected to 
the nature of consent as a liberal, contract principle. Sexual consent appears a 
morally self-evident issue of free will, but it actually veils a struggle between various 
judgments about how sex should happen, its benefits and harms, and the role of 
criminal law in regulating it. Indeed, proponents and critics of affirmative consent 
entertain different empirical and normative presumptions and often simply talk past 
each other. Structurally mapping the consent framework and the affirmative consent 
debate reveals exactly what is at stake in this new world of reform—a revelation 
necessary for meaningful dialogue on acceptable sex and acceptable sex regulation. 
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The slogans are ubiquitous: “Only ‘Yes’ Means ‘Yes’”; “Got 
Consent?”; “Consent is Hot, Assault is Not”; “Ask First!”; and the 
unsettling, “Just Because She’s Drunk Doesn’t Mean She’s DTF,” which 
appeared on glossy posters at my law school. Clear consent is clearly the 
rule. Forcible rape is totally passé, not in the sense that it does not occur, 
but in the current legal conception of sexual assault’s essence. Rape law 
scholars have begun to regard force as so archaic as to barely merit 
mention. Far from the bad-old-days in which “real rape” was limited to 
a narrow category of violent stranger assaults resisted by victims “to the 
utmost,”1 contemporary lawmakers, scholars, and university 
administrators, applying the consent framework, view as rape behaviors 
 
 1 See People v. Geddes, 3 N.W.2d 266, 267 (Mich. 1942); Kinselle v. People, 227 P. 823, 825 
(Colo. 1924). 
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ranging from brutal to boorish to quite normal.2 Today, the criminal 
law has an interest whenever unconsensual sex occurred, regardless of 
why it occurred.  
However, consent is far from clear. The urgent question is “Got 
Consent?,” but people have wildly different conceptions about when to 
answer, “I do.” Consent is a liberal, contractarian principle that seems a 
peculiar basis for the criminal regulation of sex.3 The contractual 
framework is both over- and under-inclusive. It could dictate that sexual 
agreement procured through deception, tainted by intoxication, or 
failing to meet formalities is invalid, leading to overbroad laws.4 At the 
same time, contract principles might permit defendants to procure 
sexual consent through capitalizing on fear, insecurity, or lack of 
bargaining power, so long as such behavior does not amount to the 
duress that vitiates a contract.5 As a result, “sexual consent” has a 
meaning quite distinct from consent in contract law. 
But what is this meaning? Some will say that sexual consent is 
present when parties are mentally willing to have sex. However, there 
are a variety of views about what constitutes a consensual mental state, 
ranging from enthusiastic to grudging, from hedonistic to instrumental, 
from sober to quite inebriated.6 Others argue that focusing on internal 
willingness puts victims on trial; thus, sexual consent should be about 
what the parties say and do.7 Even here, there is considerable variability 
on what constitutes performative consent. Some hold that engaging in 
sexual activity without protest, or with weak protest, communicates 
consent. Others insist that consent be “affirmatively” or “positively” 
expressed.8 To complicate matters, affirmative consent, depending on 
who you ask, runs the gamut from nonverbal foreplay to “an 
enthusiastic yes.”9 
 
 2 See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing contemporary standards). 
 3 See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract 
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 700–04 (1990). 
 4 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 
122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013) (asserting that the consent framework is inconsistent with legal 
rejection of rape by deception); cf. Mark Kelman, Thinking About Sexual Consent, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 935, 978 (2005) (book review) (complicating purely autonomist notions of sexual 
consent). 
 5 See Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171, 
204 (2013) (positing a feminist and relational theory of contract). 
 6 See infra Section I.A. 
 7 See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992) (moving to affirmative consent because 
old law created credibility contest that put victim on trial); Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape 
Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 
763, 794–98 (1986) (noting that some analyze whether complainant consented by looking at 
sexual history).  
 8 See infra Section II.F. 
 9 See infra Part II. 
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Actual definitions of consent in criminal codes and university 
manuals, with their vague references to “free agreement” and 
“affirmative cooperation,” do little to simplify matters.10 It is no wonder 
that people come to wholly different conclusions about how consent 
and affirmative consent standards actually impact legal decisions and 
human behavior. Stephen Schulhofer, the reporter for the Model Penal 
Code Sexual Assault Project to reform the much-maligned current MPC 
rape provisions,11 has defended affirmative consent as merely reflecting 
the common sense norm that “it is unacceptable to take liberties with 
someone’s person or property without permission.”12 Compare this with 
Vox Media founder Ezra Klein’s passionate, but somewhat bizarre, 
justification of California’s affirmative consent law on the ground of its 
radically regulatory nature: 
If the Yes Means Yes law is taken even remotely seriously it will settle 
like a cold winter on college campuses, throwing everyday sexual 
practice into doubt and creating a haze of fear and confusion over 
what counts as consent. . . . [However,] for one in five women to 
report an attempted or completed sexual assault means that everyday 
sexual practices on college campuses need to be upended, and men 
need to feel a cold spike of fear when they begin a sexual encounter.13 
What has caused so much confusion? In short, decades ago, 
feminist reformers affected the shift from defining rape as forced sex to 
defining it as unconsensual sex, in an effort to broaden liability for bad 
 
 10 For a thorough discussion of existing consent statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 58–61 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5 2015) 
[hereinafter MPC Draft 5]. The MPC Tentative Draft No. 1 (Apr. 30, 2014), is available at 
http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02-Article_120/20140807/03_Proposed
Revision_MPC213_Excerpt_201405.pdf, but it is substantially different. A later version of the 
Model Penal Code consent provisions was adopted by the ALI Council in January 2016 and 
updated on January 17, 2016. MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ARTICLE § 213 (AM. LAW INST., 
Selected Revisions: §§ 213.0(3) & 213.2 2016) [hereinafter MPC Revisions] (on file with 
author). However, the ALI membership did not accept that version at the annual meeting, and 
a new draft is in the works. See Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM. 
LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2016). This article refers to Draft 5 throughout. 
 11 See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be 
Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003); Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and 
Related Offenses, supra note 10. 
 12 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What It Means and Why It’s Time to Require It, 47 U. 
PAC. L. REV. 665, 681 (2016) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Consent]. Professor Schulhofer has been a 
forceful proponent of affirmative consent, through words of actions, for years. See, e.g., 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE 
OF LAW 271 (1998) [hereinafter SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX]. 
 13 Ezra Klein, “Yes Means Yes” Is A Terrible Law, and I Completely Support It, VOX (Oct. 
13, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/10/13/6966847/yes-means-yes-is-a-terrible-
bill-and-i-completely-support-it. 
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sexual behavior.14 However, even this shift proved unsatisfying to many 
activists who contended that biased or mistaken decision-makers 
misapplied the standard, leading to under-regulation of unwanted sex. 
Activists urged affirmative consent standards to compel legal actors to 
arrive at the “right” conclusion about what constitutes rape. However, 
couching this revolutionary reform as a better way of doing consent 
obscured the various presumptions and normative commitments 
underlying reformers’ ideas about what is the right conclusion. To be 
sure, “unconsensual sex” is often just a proxy for whatever one views as 
harmful or unacceptable sexual behavior (i.e., intoxicated sex, subtly 
coerced sex, insufficiently communicative sex, rough sex, etc.). Today, 
affirmative consent reform is a juggernaut. The rapid proliferation of 
law, policy, and scholarship defining sexual consent has produced a 
legal terrain marked by uncertainty, contradiction, and hidden value 
judgments. 
This Article seeks to clear up the consent confusion. It is not the 
first, nor will it be the last, word on consent in rape law. But it is the first 
to categorize and clarify the many words uttered in the media, in 
legislatures, and on campuses about the meaning of sexual consent. This 
categorical enterprise has two primary goals. First, it offers a toolkit for 
deciphering, deconstructing, and yes, dismantling affirmative consent.15 
It catalogues consent as a preface to a critical analysis of the arguments 
for and against the affirmative consent standard. The paper makes sense 
of an often muddled debate in which interlocutors entertain different 
presumptions and proceed to simply talk past each other. Some, for 
example, concentrate on whether sex without a yes is morally wrongful, 
while others focus on whether requiring a yes will help prosecutors get 
at “true” rapists who compel unwanted sex.16 Debaters fluctuate 
between formalist and legal realist assertions, empirical bases for the 
rule and theoretical ones, and individualist frames and questions of just 
social order. Structurally mapping the debate is an important step 
toward a full understanding of the exact stakes of affirmative consent 
reform. Accordingly, much of this Article is taxonomical in nature―it 
charts consent, categorizes affirmative consent standards, and indexes 
affirmative consent argument types. 
The Article has a second, more iconoclastic, goal: demystification. 
The consent framework’s unyielding and simplistic promotion of 
 
 14 Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587–603 
(2009) [hereinafter Gruber, Rape, Feminism]. 
 15 The analysis herein betrays my predisposition against affirmative consent as the 
benchmark for criminal sex regulation. Nonetheless, I am quite sympathetic to the standard 
and very far from many anti-affirmative consent polemicists. See id. 
 16 See infra Sections II.B, II.D. 
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autonomy has obfuscated the empirical and moral bases of a complex 
set of reforms.17 As noted above, many reformers initially rationalized 
affirmative consent as a way to control decision-makers’ tendency to 
exonerate defendants, even in cases of clear unwillingness.18 But that 
attempt to manage sexist jurors’ inferences has created a world in which 
law, popular discourse, and public health surveys define rape as sex 
without affirmative consent, rather than compelled or unwilling sex. 
Thus, the prohibition of a broad category of sex (sex without a yes) 
somewhat surreptitiously evolved under the banner of preventing a 
narrower, less controversial category (compelled or aversive sex). 
Understanding the empirical and normative presumptions underlying 
affirmative consent is a necessary step toward responsible management 
of unlawful sexual behavior and the criminal apparatus constructed to 
regulate it. 
Part I of the Article describes unambiguously consensual sex as a 
“consent transaction” between two (or more) people, involving both 
mental states and external manifestations of those states. Part II explains 
affirmative consent as an effort to narrow the world of external 
manifestations. It also categorizes affirmative consent standards, from 
very regulatory to more expansive. Part III maps the affirmative consent 
debate, which includes clashes over how people actually negotiate sex, 
whether sex without affirmative consent is culpable, and how 
affirmative consent laws play out in practice. The conclusion suggests 
that the rape discussion should shift from jousting over consent to truly 
grappling with the limits of acceptable sex and acceptable sex regulation. 
  
 
 17 Cf. Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Sexuality, Integrity and 
Criminal Law, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 47, 53 (1998) (“The idea of autonomy is one 
which . . . assumes rather than explicates what is valuable about sexuality itself.”). 
 18 See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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I.     CONSENT 
Consent is a philosophical, psychological, and legal quagmire, the 
escape from which I do not attempt here. Nevertheless, it bears 
mentioning that, philosophically, premising morality on consent 
implicates complicated theories of free will and determinism.19 As a 
matter of psychology, harmful and regretted but “chosen” decisions can 
be more discomfiting than unavoidable or coerced occurrences. Some 
studies of rape and trauma, for example, link lasting psychological harm 
to self-blame and feeling like one had some control over the assault.20 In 
terms of the law, critical legal theorists―feminists foremost among 
them―have argued that the principle of consent legitimates unjust 
hierarchies, economic inequality, and overt discrimination.21 From 
adhesion contracts to the Supreme Court’s approval of consent to a 
suspicionless police search, scholars have long viewed consent’s 
justificatory power with a jaundiced eye.22 
Feminists like Catharine MacKinnon assert that in a world rife 
with male hierarchy, women rarely freely choose sex.23 Given 
feminism’s anti-liberalism bent, it is curious that consent evolved as the 
enlightened construction of rape law.24 The force and coercion 
 
 19 See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL (Robert Kane ed., 2002); cf. Peter 
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (John 
Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993) (intimating that the free will determinism debate is 
a normative/legal, rather than metaphysical, debate). 
 20 See Sara E. Ullman et al., Psychosocial Correlates of PTSD Symptom Severity in Sexual 
Assault Survivors, 20 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 821, 822 (2007) (correlating trauma with 
“attributions of self-blame” and citing studies). 
 21 See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997, 
999 (1985); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of 
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1199–1200 (1990); Joseph 
William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 
1982 WIS. L. REV. 975 (1983); Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 1247, 1265 (1999); cf. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights 
Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 395 (1984). 
 22 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) [hereinafter RADIN, BOILERPLATE]; Morgan Cloud, Ignorance 
and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1143 (2007) (discussing consent searches). 
 23 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence]. More recently, MacKinnon has remarked that “sex that is forced, coerced, and 
pervasively unequal can be construed as consensual, wanted, and free.” Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081, 
1088 (2004); see also Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 130–32 
(1992); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1442, 1458 (1993) [hereinafter West, Beyond Rape]. 
 24 See Robin West, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 221 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010). In the domestic violence 
arena, feminist backlash to consent created a hyper-regulatory regime of mandatory arrest and 
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standard―which actually entails considering the larger circumstances 
of the sex―is a denigrated relic.25 So what happened? From the 1970s to 
the 1990s, rape reformers highlighted cases in which rape-permissive 
courts, jurors, and law-makers narrowly defined force to prohibit 
violently compelled sex but permit a wide variety of otherwise coerced 
sex (i.e., subtle intimidation, “pinning,” or capitalizing on scary 
circumstances).26 Thus, advocates sought to broaden the category of 
sexual incidents subject to criminal regulation.27 Some jurisdictions did 
this by expanding force to include more situations, for example, 
“emotional” or “moral” coercion.28 Other jurisdictions broadened 
regulation by defining rape as sex without consent, rendering the 
defendant’s coercive behavior (or lack thereof) mere circumstantial 
evidence of consent or irrelevant.29 The move to consent proved 
 
prosecution, concerning liberal critics about victims’ autonomy. See Leigh Goodmark, 
Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 25 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 466 
(2016) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent]; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on and Off 
Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2015) (calling force “archaic”); Lani Anne Remick, comment, Read 
Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1116 
(1993); cf. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1977) (noting that non-consent is the “ancient” definition of rape but that 
“‘force’ came to be added”). 
 26 Two Pennsylvania cases figure prominently in that critique. See Commonwealth v. 
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per curiam) (holding no “forcible 
compulsion” when complainant repeatedly said “no”), aff’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994); 
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that adult 
guardian’s threat to return fourteen-year-old to juvenile detention was not “forcible rape”), 
aff’d, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988); see also Berger, supra note 25, at 8; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 
YALE L.J. 1087, 1093 (1986) (“If in 1986 silence does not negate consent, at least crying and 
saying ‘no’ should.”); Cheryl Siskin, Criminal Law―No. The “Resistance Not Required” Statute 
and “Rape Shield Law” May Not Be Enough―Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. 
Super. Ct.) (per curiam), alloc. granted, 613 A.2d 556 (PA. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REV. 531, 560 
(1993). But see J.H., No. 6-2801-9874-2, 1995 WL 937281, at *5, 8 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs. 
Oct. 16, 1995) (finding respondent violated student conduct code prohibiting “implied use or 
threatened use of force” because “[h]e didn’t ask, and she didn’t say”). 
 27 See Kit Kinports, Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 755, 
755–56 (2001) (describing the under-inclusion argument). 
 28 See, e.g., State v. Eskridge, 526 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ohio 1988) (“[F]orce . . . can be subtle 
and psychological.”); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (rape may 
involve “moral, psychological or intellectual force”). Many feminists prefer the move toward 
broad coercion, rather than liberal consent. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and 
the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988). 
 29 The consent move was spurred on by varied analogic reasoning, such as describing rape 
as a battery—“any ‘unauthorized [sexual] touching.’” In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276 (N.J. 
1992). But the battery analogy proves complicated given that for every-day 
touchings―handshakes, back pats, etc.―the law is honored in the breach. Of course, sexual 
intercourse is not a hand shake, nor is it a fistfight. Other consent analogies fare little better (sex 
is materially different from surgery, force-feeding, taking property, etc.). Some feminists have 
 
GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2016  12:58 PM 
2016] C O N S E N T  C O N FU S I O N  423 
 
enduring, and today the nature of rape as a “harm to autonomy” is 
rarely up for debate.30 
Debated more frequently is the question of what sexual consent is. 
Consensual sex is described variously as desired, wanted, willing, or 
agreed-to sex.31 While such terms are used interchangeably, they can 
mean quite different things. People could willingly have unwanted sex, 
or they could want but not desire sex.32 For the moment, let me put 
aside any further parsing of these distinctions. For now, I, like most rape 
commentators, will treat the consent terms fungibly. The more pressing 
definitional question is whether sexual consent is a mental state, an 
external performance, or both. 
There is little controversy when the sexual actors’ performances 
correspond to their internal states. For example, if a person really did 
not want sex and candidly expressed that lack of desire, there will be 
little question that the sex was not “consensual.”33 Controversy arises, 
however, when there is mismatch between the internal state and 
external manifestations. Affirmative consent critics recoil at the idea 
that it can be rape when the complainant passionately desired—and the 
defendant believed they34 passionately desired—sex simply because the 
consent performance was deficient.35 Likewise, feminists are apt to 
 
lauded liberal autonomy’s instrumental value to women. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, From 
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 
(1999). 
 30 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 328 P.3d 77, 89 (Alaska 2014) (“[R]ape has as its goal 
preventing the loss of autonomy, dignity, free will, and bodily integrity . . . .”); People v. Soto, 
245 P.3d 410, 418 (Cal. 2011) (rape is violation of “sexual autonomy”); Estrich, supra note 26, at 
1095 (“[A]ny discussion of rape begins (and ends) with consent.”); R. George Wright, 
Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
1397, 1406 (1995) (equating “underemphasis of women’s consent” with “insufficient respect for 
the dignity of women”). 
 31 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 671 (calling consensual sex “mutually 
desired”). 
 32 Sexual “desire” seems to connote the particular intent to have sex for physical 
satisfaction. “Wanted” sex, by contrast, could mean sex that one hopes will happen for any 
reason. “Willingness” might imply a neutral state of mind, that is, the person can take the sex or 
leave it. “Agreeing” to sex might have a different meaning, involving some “meeting of the 
minds,” where a person agrees to an offer of sex. 
 33 Of course, defendants may have the option to argue lack of mens rea if their warped view 
of sexual communication led them to honestly believe the other consented. See infra notes 55–
59 and accompanying text. 
 34 I try not to specify the sex/gender of parties unless specific to a point or case. 
Occasionally, I will use “their” or “they” as a singular pronoun to signify an individual without 
sex/gender. See Jessica Bennett, She? Ze? They? What’s In a Gender Pronoun, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/fashion/pronoun-confusion-sexual-fluidity
.html?_r=0. 
 35 See Sarah Gill, Essay, Dismantling Gender and Race Stereotypes: Using Education to 
Prevent Date Rape, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 27, 61 (1996) (discussing this argument); infra notes 
165–68 and accompanying text. 
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dismiss as coerced an expressed “yes” that did not reflect internal 
willingness.36 Consequently, uncontroversial consent to sex entails what 
I call a “consent transaction,” involving both a sufficient internal mental 
state and external performance of that state. 
 
A sexual consent transaction between two people, A and B, consists 
of a three-step process. Step 1: A internally agrees to have sex. Step 2: A 
displays external manifestations of that agreement. Step 3: Based on A’s 
external manifestations and the context, B believes A internally agrees to 
have sex. Of course, B must also share A’s attitude toward the sex, and A 
must believe B internally agrees. For now, B will represent the sex 
proponent (the person seeking sex) and A will be the sex 
acceptor/rejecter. Here is an illustration of the consent transaction: 
Figure 1: The Consent Transaction 
Let us discuss each step in turn, beginning with A’s mental state.37 
 
 
 36 Some activists go even further arguing that any time a person does not internally want 
sex it is sexual assault, even if the person says “yes,” and there is no coercion. See, e.g., Wendy 
Murphy, Opinion, Title IX Protects Women. Affirmative Consent Doesn’t, WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/10/15/title-ix-protects-
women-affirmative-consent-doesn't/?utm_term=.97e664743d5b; cf. CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 82 (1987) (articulating a 
“political” definition of rape as “whenever a woman has sex and feels violated”). 
 37 When examining Figure 1, A may start to look distinctly feminine and B masculine. See 
Lacey, supra note 17, at 60 (critiquing the consent framework for establishing a gendered 
asymmetric relationship between sexual participants). 
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A.     Step 1: A’s Internal Agreement to Sex 
A consensual mental state involves a “free” decision to have sex. 
The meaning of free is subject to interpretation. As noted above, some 
feminists assert that because of gendered pressures and gross inequality, 
coercion is the default for women.38 However, proponents of consent, 
even affirmative consent, do not characterize women’s agreement to sex 
as mostly illusory, but rather hold that only specific coercive pressures 
render consent ineffective.39 For example, the September 2015 Draft of 
MPC sexual assault revisions provide that consent does not count when 
it is “the product of force, restraint, threat, coercion, or exploitation.”40 
Yet the issue of which types of “coercion” or “exploitation” (i.e., lies, 
promises, relationship, or economic factors) undermine consent is a 
subject of intense controversy among rape experts.41 Thus, the consent 
framework has not relieved policymakers of the need to discuss with 
specificity the types of pressures that render sex criminal, despite 
apparent agreement.42 
In addition, there are controversies over which mental states are in 
fact consensual. Figure 1 draws the line at grudging acquiescence, 
counting it as consensual, but designating being unsure as insufficient. 
By contrast, some commentators suggest that consent requires sex to be 
enthusiastic, deliberative, hotly desired, and/or engaged in for its own 
sake.43 Anything else, they argue, should be regulated (whether through 
criminal law, disciplinary proceedings, or public health programs).44 Of 
course, epistemic states are indefinite, and the forms they can take are 
infinite. Consequently, just as drawing lines between culpable mental 
states (knowing, reckless, negligent) involves external normative 
judgments, so does dictating the specific quality of internal consent. 
The requirement of internally consensual sex, which may appear 
 
 38 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
 39 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2151, 2177 (1995). 
 40 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 32. 
 41 See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 
(1998) (fraud and coercion); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1405–11. 
 42 See West, Beyond Rape, supra note 23, at 1442. 
 43 See Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. REV. 881, 925–28 
(2016) (cataloguing various colleges’ and universities’ sexual assault definitions that define 
consent as enthusiastic, sober, creative, sincere, etc.); see also infra Section II.B. 
 44 Indeed, the American Association of Universities study that generated the now 
(in)famous one-in-five statistic counted having sex for “promised rewards” as sexual assault. 
DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT 
AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2015), https://www.aau.edu/uploadedFiles/AAU_Publications/
AAU_Reports/Sexual_Assault_Campus_Survey/AAU_Campus_Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf 
[hereinafter AAU Study]. 
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morally self-evident, is thus really the outcome of a struggle between 
various value judgments about whether sex can be instrumental rather 
than hedonistic, whether sex is the type of life-decision that must be 
deeply contemplated or something people just go with, and whether we 
look at sex from a male or female perspective.45 Accordingly, the 
language of consent can preclude open political debate on, for example, 
the permissibility of grudging, hasty, or even undesired sex―an issue 
sociological studies indicate is more complex than one might initially 
think. Studies find that college students, female and male, widely agree 
to “unwanted sex,” meaning sex that is not physically desired. They 
engage in this unwanted sex for a variety of reasons, including status 
and relationship intimacy,46 and such sex actually produces positive 
outcomes.47 
B.     Step 2: A’s External Manifestations 
Step 2 reflects the instinct that consensual sex requires partners to 
communicate with each other. Given that sexual interaction is itself 
communicative, absolutely unexpressive sex will be rare. Thus, the 
primary issue is which external acts communicate willingness (and 
which do not). A popular view is that consenters just tell people they 
want to do something. For example, one expert opines: “Parties who 
mutually desire sexual intimacy normally communicate that desire 
freely.”48 However, sexual consent negotiation is highly context specific 
 
 45 This is necessarily the case given that any “determinations that contracts (or sexual 
relations or criminal conspiracies) were freely entered into are not determinations about ‘what 
happened,’ but rather they are value-based decisions about what should be considered choice.” 
Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance?: The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy 
and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1369, 1385 (1992) (book review); cf. West, 
supra note 24, at 246 (noting that willingness can mark the line between criminal and 
noncriminal but is not co-extensive with well-being). 
 46 See Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Stephen W. Cook, Men’s Self-Reports of Unwanted 
Sexual Activity, 24 J. SEX RES. 58 (1988); Lucia F. O’Sullivan & Elizabeth Rice Allgeier, Feigning 
Sexual Desire: Consenting to Unwanted Sexual Activity in Heterosexual Dating Relationships, 35 
J. SEX RES. 234 (1998); Susan Sprecher et al., Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent 
to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J. 
SEX RES. 125 (1994). For a fascinating literature survey on sexual compliance and sexual 
sacrifice, see Emily A. Impett & Letitia A. Peplau, Sexual Compliance: Gender, Motivational, 
and Relationship Perspectives, 40 J. SEX RES. 87 (2003). But see Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, 
Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 380 (1993) (likening sex resulting 
from “women’s desire to please men because of cultural expectations of feminine conduct” to 
sex produced by threat or fear). 
 47 See O’Sullivan & Allgeier, supra note 46. 
 48 Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670. Kudos to Fred Bloom for noticing the double 
layered use of “normally.” 
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and culturally ordered.49 Further, considering the long Anglo-American 
history of not communicating forthrightly about sexual desire, it would 
follow that internal mental states are unlikely to have some obvious and 
clear relationship to external manifestations. Indeed the social science 
on sexual consent, which we will examine in detail in Part III, confirms 
that people are normally recondite about their sexual intentions.50 
Thus, the Step 2 external manifestations are not necessarily linearly 
reflective of the Step 1 internal decision. A decision to or not to have sex 
can generate a range of variable and even contradictory manifestations, 
conditioned on many factors like community norms, relationship status, 
age, gender, sexual orientation, and individual personality. Some of the 
factors influencing sexual communicative practices—for example, 
stereotypical sex roles—are not palatable and reflect various inequalities 
and harms experienced by complainants individually and women 
generally. Thus, the way people do communicate sexual willingness 
might differ from the way we think they should. And it might lead us to 
embrace the problematic belief―explored later―that instead of 
addressing the inequalities underlying the prevailing sex script, we 
should randomly punish some who engage the script in the hope that it 
will change the world. 
C.     Step 3: B’s Understanding of A’s Mental State 
In a perfect consent transaction, B’s belief that A mentally agreed to 
sex will be a correct interpretation of A’s external manifestations. Things 
get more difficult when there is a discrepancy between B’s belief and A’s 
actual state of mind. For example, B might interpret A’s manifestations 
as indicating willingness, when, in fact, A is adamantly opposed to the 
sexual act.51 Indeed, studies show that men are prone to interpret 
“friendly” behavior as consent, while women view consent as requiring 
verbalization.52 Most scholars would say that B is permitted to have sex 
if he has a reasonable belief that A is willing.53 Nevertheless, there 
 
 49 See Sprecher et al., supra note 46, at 126. 
 50 See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 51 Alternatively, B might be convinced that A is unwilling and decide to pursue sex anyway, 
but, in fact, A is quietly enthusiastic. We would probably consider B a pretty bad person and a 
walking hazard, but the requirement of actus reus would foreclose liability. 
 52 See Antonia Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions for Friendly Behavior: Do Males 
Misperceive Females’ Friendliness?, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1982); Susan E. 
Hickman & Charlene L. Muehlenhard, “By the Semi-Mystical Appearance of a Condom”: How 
Young Women and Men Communicate Sexual Consent in Heterosexual Situations, 36 J. SEX 
RES. 258 (1999); Terry P. Humphreys & Mélanie M. Brousseau, The Sexual Consent Scale—
Revised: Development, Reliability, and Preliminary Validity, 47 J. SEX RES. 420, 421 (2010). 
 53 There may be a case for strict liability in a particular class of “public welfare offenses,” 
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remains the perennial problem of the meaning of reasonableness in an 
unreasonable world.54 Where sexist norms prevail and “reasonable” 
people presume women consent unless they resist, requiring 
reasonableness will hardly produce justice.55 Rape reformers who regard 
the reasonable belief standard as too lenient turn to affirmative consent. 
The goal is to identify a limited set of external manifestations indicative 
of consent to nonsexist people. If such manifestations are not present, B 
is guilty regardless of whether B believed A was willing, and in fact the 
larger (sexist) society would agree with B’s assessment. We will discuss 
affirmative consent in more detail in the next two Parts. 
It gets even more complicated when we subjectivize B’s intent. If B 
is totally clueless, has an overinflated self-image of sexiness, or adheres 
to a defective sexual script, B might honestly believe that A agreed to 
sex, even though reasonable people would have read A’s behavior 
otherwise. B might in fact be horrified to know the sex was undesired. 
Nevertheless, B’s actions, though well-intentioned, are negligent, and 
the question becomes whether we should punish a person who honestly 
but negligently misinterprets external manifestations. Unreasonable 
actions that harm others typically generate civil, rather than criminal, 
liability.56 Under general criminal law principles, B is not liable for rape 
if B honestly (or non-recklessly) believed A was willing, regardless of the 
reasonableness of this view.57 Nevertheless, many jurisdictions do adopt 
a negligence standard for sexual assault.58 This leads to the criticism that 
negligence is imprecise and overly punitive, given the variability in how 
people define reasonably prudent sexual behavior.59 All this said, for 
 
because of the danger and difficulty in proving intent, but lack of intent is generally anathema 
in individual traditional crimes. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952). 
 54 This reasonable-racist/sexist/homophobe problem comes up in a variety of situations in 
criminal law. See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN 
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); see also Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of 
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 
(1994); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. 
REV. 591 (1981). 
 55 See, e.g., Dana Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2687 (1991). 
 56 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) cmt. 5 at 244 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 57 See, e.g., MPC Draft No. 5, supra note 10, at 147 (“If the actor honestly and sincerely 
believes a sexual overture is welcomed, there should not be liability even if the other person in 
fact found the date insufferable, and yet continued to be politely accommodating.”). 
 58 See id. at 169 (surveying case law and concluding that a negligence mens rea for 
unconsensual sex is the “prevailing view in contemporary American case law”). 
 59 See id. at 171 (noting the “concern[] that a negligence standard in this context will result 
in penal liability greatly disproportionate to fault”). 
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most theorists, so long as B acts within reasonable communicative 
norms, B has acted lawfully.60 
In sum, an uncontroversial sexual consent transaction involves: (1) 
A’s internal decision to have sex; (2) A’s external manifestations of that 
decision; and (3) B’s (reasonable) belief, based on the external 
manifestations and context, that A is willing to have sex. In the typical 
contested consent case, A claims the sex was internally unwanted. B 
responds either that A did internally agree, that B (reasonably) believed 
A internally agreed, or both. The jury, not being mind-readers, will 
resolve the issue by looking at A’s external manifestations in context. 
The tricky part is that decision-makers harbor a wide spectrum of views 
as to what constitutes internal willingness, how that willingness is or 
should be manifested, and how a person should interpret those 
manifestations. 
II.     AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
Determining whether there is a valid consent transaction in any 
given case is a difficult task. There are so many pieces to the puzzle of 
internal willingness, external manifestation, and defendant’s mens rea, 
not to mention disputes over what occurred, creating credibility 
contests. The ordinary consent standard leaves it to police officers, 
prosecutors, and jurors to determine the parameters of a consensual 
mental state and divine the proper meaning of external manifestations. 
Rape reformers are rightfully concerned that such decision-makers can 
make bad calls by, for example, finding subtly coerced agreement valid, 
invariably deriving willingness from silence, or allowing the defendant 
too much leeway to interpret any behavior as consent. To reduce the 
risk of bad calls, reformers advocate for affirmative consent.61 
Affirmative consent laws direct decision-makers to focus on what 
complainants do or say, and not on what they intend. Step one is no 
longer part of the picture. This is not a radical change, given that jurors 
in ordinary consent cases generally look at the external manifestations 
in context to determine the complainant’s mental state.62 It is the second 
 
 60 See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 26, at 1102–03; Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: 
Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 41, 67 (1993) (advocating that “the 
minimum culpable mens rea as to consent should be negligence”). 
 61 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 426 (2000) [hereinafter 
Bryden, Redefining Rape]; see, e.g., In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277–78 (N.J. 1992). 
 62 The exception would be an ordinary consent case where the complainant was silent, 
passive, or resisting, but he sent a text right after the sex stating: “I just had the best sexual 
experience and was totally happy that my partner took control.” Here, the jury might acquit, 
determining that the complainant internally agreed to the sex based, not on his external 
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directive that drives the passionate debate: only certain step two external 
manifestations count as “affirmative consent.” Affirmative consent 
reforms narrow the world of communicative performances that make 
sex permissible. 
The meaning of “affirmative consent,” nevertheless, is not uniform, 
and can range from narrow communicative prescriptions (contract, 
verbal yes) to any behavior that conveys internal agreement (foreplay, 
acquiescence). Narrow formulations protect victims but appear sex-
regulatory and unfair to defendants. However, broad formulations that 
allow any words, conduct, or omissions to establish affirmative consent 
are not much of a reform at all. A number criminal rape statutes include 
some form of affirmative consent. But these laws are notoriously vague, 
requiring, for example, “positive cooperation” or “freely given 
agreement” without specifying whether that cooperation or agreement 
requires something more than participation without protest, and what 
that something more is.63 The below categories of affirmative consent 
are culled from the vast amount of criminal law, educational policy, 
scholarship, media commentary, and internet discussion regarding 
affirmative consent. Here is a spectrum of affirmative consent 
formulations from more sex-regulatory/prosecutorial to less sex-
regulatory/lenient: 
 
manifestations at the time of the encounter, but the later text. In this case, an affirmative 
consent standard, which eliminates step one from the inquiry, would make a big difference, 
even if it permitted any type of external manifestation to count as affirmative consent. 
 63 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2014) (“positive cooperation in act or attitude 
pursuant to an exercise of free will.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-1.70 (West 2002) 
(“freely given agreement to the act of sexual penetration”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 
2005) (“words or overt actions by . . . indicating a freely given agreement”); In re M.T.S., 609 
A.2d at 1277 (“affirmatively and freely given authorization”). For a current accounting of the 
various types of affirmative consent laws, see Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12; Tuerkheimer, 
Affirmative Consent, supra note 25; and MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 58–61. Thus, the below 
standards are primarily taken from university conduct codes, which tend to be more specific 
about affirmative consent. 
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Figure 2: The Affirmative Consent Scale 
The following Sections examine each formulation, starting with the 
most regulatory. 
A.     The Contract 
The most restrictive construction of affirmative consent―the 
signed, notarized, contract in triplicate―is largely, although not 
exclusively, a product of the derisive discourse of rape reform 
opponents, who seek to provoke public ridicule of affirmative consent.64 
That said, it is not completely fallacious to ally the sex contract with 
anti-rape activism. Commentary on the web extolls the written contract 
as a good way to manage sexual communication.65 Indeed, on 
affirmativeconsent.com, one can purchase “Affirmative Consent Kits” 
for $12.00, which include “Yes Means Yes Cards.”66 The website is part 
of the “Affirmative Consent Project,” a group that lobbies law and 
policy makers to adopt affirmative consent standards.67 Founder Alison 
Berke Morano asserts the cards are not a joke: “We’re trying to change 
 
 64 See Callie Beusman, ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws Will Not Ruin Sex Forever, Despite Idiotic 
Fears, JEZEBEL (Sept. 8, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://jezebel.com/yes-means-yes-laws-will-not-ruin-
sex-forever-despite-i-1630704944. 
 65 See, e.g., Betsy Gallup, Sex Contracts, LOVE TO KNOW, http://dating.lovetoknow.com/
Sex_Contracts (last visited Oct. 23, 2016). 
 66 See AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT, http://www.affirmativeconsent.com (last visited Oct. 5, 
2016). The price of the packet in 2015 was a mere $2.99. 
 67 Maura Lerner, National Group Hopes to Stir Talk with Its Sex Consent Contracts, STAR 
TRIB. (July 9, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://www.startribune.com/group-hopes-to-stir-talk-with-its-
sex-consent-contracts/312694551. 
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the conversation and make people more secure,” she explained to the 
press.68 
B.     An Enthusiastic Yes 
A step down from the signed contract formulation of affirmative 
consent is the requirement of an “enthusiastic” verbal yes. Reflective 
(and reflexive) of the maligned no-means-yes trope, this requirement 
holds that yes means no, unless the yes is declared with alacrity.69 The 
“enthusiastic yes” mantra is repeated in freshman orientations and 
enshrined in the feminist blogosphere.70 In some ways, the requirement 
of perpetual enthusiasm might be more difficult to attain than even the 
signed contract in triplicate. One blogger opines: 
“Sex” is an evolving series of actions and interactions. You have to 
have the enthusiastic consent of your partner for all of them. And 
even if you have your partner’s consent for a particular activity, you 
have to be prepared for it to change. . . . [I]f you want to have sex, 
you have to be continually in a state of enthusiastic consent with 
your partner.71 
The requirement of an enthusiastic expression is related to the new 
feminist ideology that sex is gender oppression unless the woman 
(typically envisioned as the sex acceptor) engages in it deliberatively and 
hedonistically.72 The enthusiastic yes reform thus weighs in both on the 
quality of a consenting mental state and the character of the 
 
 68  Blake Neff, Sexual Consent Contracts Are Now A Real Thing You Can Buy, DAILY 
CALLER (July 8, 2015, 8:52 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/07/08/sexual-consent-contracts-
are-now-a-real-thing-you-can-buy/#ixzz3udpy8nCO; see also Lerner, supra note 67. 
 69 See, e.g., YALE UNIV., 2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 21 (2014), http://your.yale.edu/
sites/default/files/files/Yale%20Clery%20Report%202013.pdf (stating that the University directs 
students to “[h]old out for enthusiasm”); ELON UNIV., ANNUAL SECURITY REPORT 8 (2013), 
http://www.elon.edu/docs/e-web/bft/safety/Elon%20University%20ASR%202013.pdf (consent 
is “comprehensible, unambiguous, positive, and enthusiastic”); see also Gersen & Suk, supra 
note 43, at 924–30 (discussing the enthusiasm requirement). 
 70 See Cheryl Corley, HBCUs Move to Address Campus Sexual Assaults, but Is It Enough?, 
NPR (Sept. 29, 2014, 3:26 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/29/351534164/hbcus-move-to-
address-campus-sexual-assaults-but-is-it-enough (describing a Title IX hearing at Howard 
University where the administrator stated, “[r]epeat after me—an enthusiastic yes”). 
 71 Jaclyn Friedman, Consent Is Not a Lightswitch, AMPLIFY: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2010), http://
amplifyyourvoice.org/u/Yes_Means_Yes/2010/11/9/Consent-Is-Not-A-Lightswitch. 
 72 See, e.g., Creating a Culture of Consent, HARV. U. OFF. OF SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION 
& RESPONSE, http://osapr.harvard.edu/creating-culture-consent (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) 
(embedding into the notion of consent that each person is “sincere in their desires” and that 
they “know[] and feel[]—without a doubt—that the other person is excited to engage [in sexual 
conduct]”). 
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performance. Both must be carnal and ebullient. In times past, the sex 
regulatory tendency was toward instrumentalist intercourse, strictly for 
reproductive purposes. Today’s regulatory impulses tend toward 
sybaritic sex, strictly for (hetero female-style) pleasure purposes.73 
C.     Yes Means Yes 
Moving down the line, a more common formulation of affirmative 
consent is the requirement of a verbal yes. Reformers, activists, and 
college administrators tout this threshold as necessary to ensure that 
one’s sexual partner has internally agreed to sex.74 Nonetheless, even 
those sympathetic to clear modes of sexual communication 
acknowledge that insisting on a specific word to legitimate sex is 
artificial and unrealistic, given the heterodoxy of intimate signaling. 
Thus, while “only yes means yes” is a catchy sound bite, for many 
affirmative consent proponents, the permission script can be more 
variable.75 In this view, one does not have to ask for and receive a “yes,” 
but there are communicative hurdles that must be traversed. Thus, a 
common formulation of affirmative consent dictates that a person 
seeking intercourse must stop, explicitly seek permission, and obtain 
permission in some clear form. 
D.     Stop and Ask 
The stop-and-ask approach, which appears frequently in university 
policies, puts a legally enforceable obligation on the sex proponent to 
 
 73 And what is pleasurable to women is conceived of in very narrow and gendered terms as 
sensitive, communicative, loving, committed, gentle sex. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing 
Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 206–07 (2001); cf. 
Chamallas, supra note 28, at 839 (advocating regulation to encourage “reservation of sex for 
intimacy and pleasure,” but not through criminal law). 
 74 Although most colleges do not require verbal consent, they counsel strongly in favor of it. 
See, e.g., Amherst College Sexual Misconduct and Harassment Policy, AMHERST C., https://
www.amherst.edu/campuslife/health-safety-wellness/sexual-respect/sexual-misconduct-and-
harassment-policy/node/497976 (“Relying on non-verbal communication can lead to 
misunderstandings. . . . In the absence of an outward demonstration, consent does not exist.”); 
cf. Tovia Smith, Campuses Consider Following New York’s Lead On ‘Yes Means Yes’ Policy, NPR 
(July 8, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225048/campuses-consider-
following-new-yorks-lead-on-yes-means-yes-policy (quoting Governor Cuomo as 
characterizing New York’s affirmative consent bill as requiring “[t]he other person . . . to say 
yes. It’s yes on both sides.”). 
 75 See The Johns Hopkins University Sexual Misconduct Policy and Procedures, JOHNS 
HOPKINS U., http://sexualassault.jhu.edu/policies-laws/#Section%20III%20-%20Definitions 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Johns Hopkins Policy] (requiring “a clear ‘yes,’ verbal or 
otherwise”). 
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stop the sexual interaction, expressly seek permission for a specific act, 
and obtain a “yes” or its functional equivalent from the sex acceptor.76 
California’s highly publicized and controversial affirmative consent law, 
for example, mandates that university conduct codes define consent as 
“affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual 
activity” and specify that “[i]t is the responsibility of each person 
involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the 
affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual 
activity.”77 This language, like that of many affirmative consent statutes, 
permits a variety of interpretations. Alarmist opponents call it the sex 
contract.78 Defenders say that the law merely demands consent in its 
ordinary sense.79 Despite its somewhat ambiguous nature, the law does 
appear to require some stop-and-ask ritual. 
 
 76 See, e.g., Gender-Based Misconduct Policy for Students, COLUM. U. 7 (Sept. 19, 2016), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/studentconduct/documents/GBMPolicyandProceduresfor
Students.pdf [hereinafter Columbia Policy] (“If there is confusion or ambiguity, participants in 
sexual activity need to stop and talk about each person’s willingness to continue.”); Policy on 
Harassment, Discrimination, and Sexual Misconduct, U. CHI., https://studentmanual
.uchicago.edu/page/policy-harassment-discrimination-and-sexual-misconduct#Consent (last 
updated Aug. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Chicago Policy] (“It is the responsibility of the person who 
wants to engage in a sexual activity to obtain the consent of the other person for that sexual 
activity.”); Policy on Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment and Other Forms of Interpersonal 
Violence, U. VA. 13 (July 1, 2015), https://vpsa.virginia.edu/sites/vpsa.virginia.edu/files/Title%
20IX%20VAWA%20Umbrella%20Policy.pdf (“stop and clarify”); Prohibited Sexual Conduct: 
Sexual Misconduct, Sexual Assault, Stalking, Relationship Violence, Violation of University or 
Court Directives, Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and Retaliation, STAN. U. (Mar. 11, 
2016), https://adminguide.stanford.edu/printpdf/chapter-1/subchapter-7/policy-1-7-3 
[hereinafter Stanford Policy] (“It is the responsibility of person(s) involved in sexual activity to 
ensure that he/she/they have the affirmative consent of the other . . . .”); Student Sexual 
Misconduct Policy and Procedures: Duke’s Commitment to Title IX, DUKE U., https://
studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/z-policies/student-sexual-misconduct-policy-dukes-
commitment-title-ix#consent (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Duke Policy] (“[I]t is 
essential that each participant stops and clarifies, verbally, willingness to continue.”); Wesleyan 
University 2016–2017 University Standards and Regulations, WESLEYAN U. 23, http://
www.wesleyan.edu/studentaffairs/studenthandbook/StudentHandbook.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 
2016) [hereinafter Wesleyan Code] (“It is the responsibility of the person who wants to engage 
in sexual activity to insure consent of their partner(s).”). The MPC draft makes some overtures 
toward the stop-and-ask model, stating that “the more assertive party [must] ensure 
receptiveness to each more intimate or different act of penetration,” but ultimately leaves it to 
the jury to determine whether there is consent “on the basis of all the circumstances.” MPC 
Draft 5, supra note 10, at 73. 
 77 S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). The name of the bill is “Student 
Safety: Sexual Assault,” but it is widely referred to as the “Affirmative Consent” or even “Yes-
Means-Yes” bill. 
 78 See, e.g., Beusman, supra note 64; Yehuda Remer, California To Redefine Sex As Rape, 
TRUTH REVOLT (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.truthrevolt.org/news/california-redefine-sex-rape.  
 79 See, e.g., Beusman, supra note 64. 
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Under the California law, the sex proponent must “ensure” that 
there is affirmative consent.80 Elsewhere, the law requires “reasonable 
steps . . . to ascertain whether the complainant affirmatively 
consented.”81 One plausible reading of this language is that a person has 
to do no more than look for reasonable signs of agreement. However, 
the word “ensure” indicates that sex proponents must, in some 
meaningful sense, guarantee consent. One might accordingly be 
concerned that ensuring consent requires magic words or, worse, a 
document to record consent.82 And now the sex contract interpretation 
seems a bit less like conservative men’s paranoia.83 
More likely, the “ensure” language obligates sex proponents, before 
and frequently during a make-out session, to stop and ask for 
permission, something like, “Do you want to do it?,” or as one 
university public awareness video counsels, “Do you want to bump and 
grind with me?”84 The sex acceptor must then give an indication of 
permission, something like a thumbs up, or “I would really like to bump 
and grind with you.”85 Some of the stop-and-ask scripts offered by 
college administrators and activists verge on humorous, reminiscent of 
spoof 1970s pick-up lines. One university pamphlet, “Making Consent 
Fun,” suggests procuring consent through questions like, “Baby, you 
want to make a bunk bed: me on top, you on bottom?” and “Would you 
like to try an Australian kiss? It’s like a French kiss, but ‘Down 
Under.’”86 Or consider these directives from a “sex-positive” feminist 
blogger for attaining consent: “Describe a hot fantasy before you hit the 
bedroom,” and “Use your body as a guide: You can’t go grabbing 
someone else’s parts without asking, but you can definitely grab at your 
own.”87 These suggestions illustrate the difficulty in formulating the 
ideal enlightened-but-sexy consent script. 
 
 80 S.B. 967; see also Wesleyan Code, supra note 76, at 23 (using the word “insure”). 
 81 S.B. 967. 
 82 Indeed, some policies require that people “verbally clarify” ambiguous consent. See, e.g., 
Columbia Policy, supra note 76. 
 83 See supra Section II.A. 
 84 SAVP Vassar, How do I Ask For Consent?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 28, 2014), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbyaFyr2h6Q. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Where is Your Line: Consent is Sexy!, U. WYO., http://www.uwyo.edu/stop/resources/
10_stop_consent_sexy_booklet.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). See Gersen & Suk, supra note 43, 
at 928–29 for more examples. 
 87 Kristen Sollee, 4 Sexy Ways To Ask For Consent, Because It Can Be A Turn-On, BUSTLE 
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://bustle.com/articles/103236-4-sexy-ways-to-ask-for-consent-because-it-
can-be-a-turn-on. 
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E.     Clear and Contemporaneous Consent 
The next formulation of affirmative consent falls between stop-
and-ask and the world of Step 2 external manifestations. A number of 
sexual consent policies do not require magic words or an ask-and-
answer process, but they do demand “clear” agreement specific to and 
contemporaneous with a particular sexual act.88 Here, affirmative 
consent to sex cannot just be a make-out session, but must involve some 
relatively unequivocal communication of agreement to the particular 
sex act. When pressed, commentators have difficulty identifying the line 
between foreplay that demonstrates consent to just that foreplay and 
foreplay that demonstrates consent to more intimate sexual acts.89 The 
important thing is that in this version of affirmative consent, such a line 
exists, which means that only a subset of make-out sessions count as 
affirmative consent to sexual penetration. 
That subset can be broader or narrower. Many commentators hold 
that “kissing alone” is not affirmative consent to penetrative intercourse, 
but otherwise decline to delineate which intimate activities constitute 
“clear” agreement.90 A good number of scholars and most university 
policies go further and maintain that affirmative consent must be 
specific to “each act,” that is, every stage of the sexual proceedings.91 
This would indicate that kissing does not communicate consent to 
breast touching, breast touching does not communicate consent to 
genital touching, genital touching does not communicate consent to 
oral sex, and oral sex does not communicate consent to genital 
 
 88 See, e.g., Prohibited Student Conduct: Sexual Assault, CORNELL U., http://
titleix.cornell.edu/prohibited-conduct/sexual-assault (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (defining 
affirmative consent as “words or actions [that] create clear permission”); Sexual Misconduct, U. 
COLO. (July 1, 2015), http://www.cu.edu/sites/default/files/5014.pdf [hereinafter Colorado 
Policy] (“unambiguous . . . agreement”); Sexual Respect: Definitions, DARTMOUTH C., http://
www.dartmouth.edu/sexualrespect/definitions.html#consent (last updated Feb. 3, 2015) (“clear 
and unambiguous agreement, expressed in mutually understandable words or action”); Yale 
Sexual Misconduct Policies and Related Definitions, YALE U., http://smr.yale.edu/sexual-mis
conduct-policies-and-definitions (last updated May 10, 2016) (“unambiguous . . . agreement”); 
see also SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 271 (advocating “permission 
. . . clearly communicated”). 
 89 See infra note 115–21 and accompanying text (discussing the complexities of foreplay). 
 90 See, e.g., Note, Acquaintance Rape and Degrees of Consent: “No” Means “No,” but What 
Does “Yes” Mean?, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2341, 2345–46 (2004) (critiquing general view that 
consent to one activity implies consent to another). 
 91 See, e.g., Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment, Sexual Violence, Relationship and 
Interpersonal Violence and Stalking Policy, BROWN U. 7 (Sept. 2, 2016), https://
www.brown.edu/about/administration/title-ix/sites/brown.edu.about.administration.title-ix/
files/uploads/policy-final-sept-16.pdf [hereinafter Brown Policy] (affirmative consent to “each 
instance of sexual contact”). 
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penetration.92 In this view, there must be some additional (although not 
always specified) expression that conveys clear agreement to a sex act in 
a way that participation in the overall intimate encounter does not.93 
A similar requirement of consent contemporaneity specifies that 
present consent cannot be inferred from past consent or an existing 
sexual relationship.94 Sex proponents may be permitted to contextualize 
external manifestations (i.e., kissing and petting), with recent 
occurrences (i.e., the sex acceptor said “take the lead tonight”). They 
may not, however, contextualize that same kissing and petting with past 
evidence (i.e., on ten previous occasions, petting led to sex). Although 
most of these policies do not say that past intimacy or relationship status 
is completely irrelevant, they do single out past events/relationship as 
“not indicative” of present consent.95 This suggests that the external 
manifestations must be the type that would clearly convey sexual 
willingness to a stranger, even if the sex occurs between two people in an 
existing sexual relationship.96 
A concept related to contemporaneity, which appears frequently in 
expert commentary and university handbooks, is that affirmative 
 
 92 See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1420 (2005); 
Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (“Consent to one form of sexual activity does not imply 
consent to other forms of sexual activity.”); see also Duke Policy, supra note 76; Sexual Assault, 
Stalking and Relationship Violence, U. MINN. app. (Aug. 2015), https://policy.umn.edu/
operations/sexualassault [hereinafter Minnesota Policy]; Sexual Misconduct, EMORY U. (Sept. 
26, 2016), https://policies.emory.edu/8.2. The MPC draft “requires consent for each act of 
sexual penetration” and states that “consenting to oral sex act does not necessarily imply 
permission to engage in vaginal or anal sex.” MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 73 (emphasis 
added). However, it also “leaves room for . . . interpretive disputes about how to understand 
such words and conduct under all the circumstances.” Id. 
 93 The now-infamous Antioch College Sexual Offense Prevention Policy attempted to 
specify such temporal lines, stating: “Verbal consent should be obtained with each new level of 
physical and/or sexual behavior in any given interaction, regardless of who initiates it. Asking 
‘Do you want to have sex with me?’ is not enough. The request for consent must be specific to 
each act.” A 1996 version of the policy, originally passed in 1993, is available at http://
www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/jhamlin/3925/Readings/Antioch.html. Its radical nature drew 
biting ridicule. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 687 (1999) 
(discussing “vitriolic criticisms” in the media). 
 94 See Brown Policy, supra note 91, at 7 (past or present relationship does not necessarily 
imply consent); Chicago Policy, supra note 76; Stanford Policy, supra note 76; sources cited 
supra note 92 (consent to one act is not consent to another). 
 95 Compare Chicago Policy, supra note 76 (sexual relationship does not “in and of itself” 
constitute consent), and Stanford Policy, supra note 76 (dating relationship does not “by itself” 
indicate consent), with Colorado Policy, supra note 88 (previous and current sexual 
relationships “do not imply consent”), and Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (previous 
relationship “is not consent to sexual activity”). 
 96 See Columbia Policy, supra note 76, at 7 (“The definition of consent does not vary based 
upon . . . relationship status.”). 
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consent must be “continuous,” “persistent,” or “ongoing.”97 In terms of 
internal consent, continuous agreement is epistemologically 
problematic if it renders sex unconsensual whenever a party has a 
fleeting second thought. More plausible is that persistent consent means 
there must be an overall mental state of agreement, even though 
uncertainty or hesitation might occasionally crop up. The requirement 
of ongoing external consent is similarly confounding. What exactly does 
a continuous communication of agreement look, or sound, like? The 
requirement of ongoing performative consent must instead mean 
something like specific consent to each critical act.98 
F.     Contextual Consent and No Means No 
I will end this parsing of affirmative consent by touching on 
formulations that are related to, and sometimes even called, “affirmative 
consent,” although they are very far from yes means yes, stop and ask, 
and clear consent standards. Several past drafts of the MPC sexual 
assault revisions purport to establish “affirmative consent,” but in fact 
set up a standard in which nearly all external manifestations can, in 
context, count as evidence of internal agreement.99 In fact, the MPC 
standard acknowledges that silence and passivity can sometimes 
communicate consent.100 However, there is a meaningful limitation on 
this free reign to interpret the external manifestations: when a person 
utters a verbal refusal, one must presume that the person is unwilling, 
regardless of the overall context.101 
Some may be concerned that no means no is too artificial, given 
that young people sometimes engage in perfunctory and duplicitous 
sexual protest.102 The MPC draft, however, tempers the directive: “no” 
can be countered by any subsequent―though curiously not preceding or 
simultaneous―words or actions indicating consent.103 Accordingly, 
 
 97 See, e.g., S.B. 967, 2014 Leg., 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (“Affirmative consent must 
be ongoing throughout a sexual activity.”); Johns Hopkins Policy, supra note 75; Minnesota 
Policy, supra note 92, app.; Stanford Policy, supra note 76.  
 98 Thus “ongoing” is used in counter-distinction to irrevocable. See, e.g., Stanford Policy, 
supra note 76 (“Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be 
revoked at any time.”). 
 99 See, e.g., MPC Draft 5, supra note 10. The January 2016 Council Draft wisely drops the 
“affirmative consent” label in favor of “contextual consent,” but the standard still requires 
expressive consent and presumes that no means no. See MPC Revisions, supra note 10. 
 100 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 34. 
 101 Id. at 53. 
 102 See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 103 MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 54. 
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assessing a package of external manifestations that includes a “no” is 
identical to an ordinary consent assessment, so long as something 
performative followed the “no.” And since the draft counts even passive 
engagement as consent performance, its no-means-no rule would 
primarily affect cases where the “no” immediately precedes the relevant 
sex act. In any case, even a stricter no-means-no rule is a far cry from 
the type of regulation represented by the various affirmative consent 
formulas examined above. This is precisely why activists urge the move 
from no means no to yes means yes.104 
Finally, some laws make sex a rape only when the victim expressly 
refuses or resists. These refusal laws, like New York’s felony provision 
requiring that “the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not 
consent,” differ substantially from laws that punish any unconsensual 
sex.105 Refusal laws might not criminalize a situation where the victim 
was clearly unwilling but did not openly protest. For example, in one 
California case, the defendant awoke the complainant, a houseguest 
sleeping in the living room, from a deep slumber, quickly penetrated 
her, ejaculated, and left.106 The lethargic and surprised complainant had 
no time to protest.107 Although the California court ultimately found 
nonconsent (and force),108 one could imagine such a defendant being 
acquitted under a refusal law.109 However, the alternative to a 
presumption of willingness in the absence of explicit refusal does not 
have to be a presumption of unwillingness in the absence of explicit 
affirmative agreement. Rather, an ordinary consent law could refrain 
from presupposing―and dictating canons of sexual interpretation 
reflecting―a general human disposition toward sex (desirous or 
repulsed). It instead can direct decision-makers to focus on the details of 
the sexual interaction, without any presumptions about an overall 
stance toward sex. 
 
 104 See, e.g., Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational 
Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321 (2005); see also 
Jake New, More College Campuses Swap ‘No Means No’ for ‘Yes Means Yes’, PBS (Oct. 17, 2014, 
1:04 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/means-enough-college-campuses. 
 105 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney 2009); see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-318(8), 
319(1) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-402(1), 406(1) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 2015). 
 106 People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); see also MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 61–
62 (indicating this case evidences the need for affirmative consent). 
 107 Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1185. 
 108 Id. at 1190. 
 109 Then again, this might not happen. See State v. Lisasuain, 117 A.3d 1154, 1158 (N.H. 
2015) (finding passive behavior without refusal to satisfy rape statute requiring victims to 
“indicate[] by speech or conduct that there is not freely given consent”). 
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Having examined the various formulations of affirmative consent, 
from more to less regulatory, let us now turn to the arguments for and 
against them. 
III.     THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT DEBATE 
The preceding Part emphasized the great variability in what 
affirmative consent is. There is perhaps even greater diversity and 
perplexity regarding why affirmative consent is desirable. The 
justifications and criticisms of affirmative consent sometimes assume 
strong and sometimes assume weak versions of the standard. “Briefs” 
for and against the standard can be self-contradictory. For example, 
affirmative consent is sometimes rationalized on the ground that the 
rule simply codifies actual sexual practice.110 Other times, supporters 
articulate a directly contradictory claim, namely, that because of 
widespread sexist practices, affirmative consent policies are necessary to 
provoke “cultural change.”111 This Part catalogues affirmative consent 
arguments in an effort to give the reader clarity on the standard’s 
empirical and normative justifications. It should be noted that the 
persuasiveness of any given argument is dependent, to some extent, on 
which affirmative consent formulation it assumes. In addition, some 
commentators find strict affirmative consent standards tolerable in the 
college discipline, but not criminal, context.112 There are four types of 
justifications of affirmative consent: empirical, aspirational, retributive, 
and distributional. 
A.     The Empirical Argument: Affirmative Consent Reflects Sexual 
Practice 
Affirmative consent reforms respond, in large part, to the problem 
that decision-makers can interpret external manifestations incorrectly 
and impermissibly. According to the argument, jurors and state actors, 
due to prejudice or mistake, will regard too wide a range of 
performances as indicating internal willingness.113 There are 
 
 110 See infra notes 116–21 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 112 This Article does not deeply probe the distinction between college discipline and criminal 
prosecution. 
 113 See, e.g., Beatrice Diehl, Note, Affirmative Consent in Sexual Assault: Prosecutors’ Duty, 
28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 508 (2015) (stating that an affirmative consent standard will 
combat jurors’ adherence to “rape myths” about how women communicate about sex and 
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undoubtedly some prejudiced decision-makers who view women who 
act sexy, go to parties, get drunk, etc., as “deserving” of sexual assault 
and simply ignore the legal question of consent. However, requiring 
affirmative consent will hardly affect a decision-maker determined to 
focus on the complainant’s “precipitating” behavior. A sexist jury set on 
acquitting will simply ignore the affirmative consent standard just as it 
would a regular consent standard.114 
Affirmative consent advocates more likely have in mind decision-
makers who inaccurately assess external manifestations due to incorrect 
views about how people communicate sexual willingness―views that 
may be influenced by gender stereotypes. In reality, reformers contend, 
people do not say “no” when they mean “yes,” people move from 
foreplay to sex only after forthright discussion, and people are active 
rather than passive when they want sex.115 Affirmative consent 
proponents often simply declare the truth of their observations about 
actual sexual negotiation.”116 For example, one scholar pronounces that 
it is a “myth” to believe that “‘no’ does not always mean ‘no.’”117 
In promoting their views of the empirical world of sex, activists 
sometimes play fast-and-loose with social science. Rape theorist 
Michelle Anderson, for example, advocates a form of stop-and-ask that 
criminalizes sexual penetration not preceded by open negotiation.118 She 
rationalizes this reform in part by asserting that under existing “social 
and sexual mores,” people candidly negotiate before each act of sexual 
penetration―an observation that might run counter to common 
instincts regarding sexual interaction.119 Anderson bases this conclusion 
about sexual consent on a national survey of young adults’ sexual health, 
which asked: “Thinking about your current sexual or most recent sexual 
relationship, have you ever talked to your partner about what you feel 
comfortable doing sexually?,” to which the vast majority answered 
 
clarify “confusion” by establishing that only yes means yes); see also supra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
 114 Social science indicates that jurors’ belief systems are more predictive of outcomes in 
mistaken consent cases than the breadth of the legal definition of consent. See Dan M. Kahan, 
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010); see also Bryden, Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 417. 
 115 See Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670 (characterizing open communication as 
normal); cf. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 23, at 652–54 (opining that 
reasonable consent will reflect a male-oriented point of view). 
 116 The MPC draft cites a survey in which college students called the affirmative consent 
“realistic.” However, it is unclear that respondents understood the standard, given that many 
thought there was “not much difference” from no means no. MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 64 
& n.178 (citing WASHINGTON POST-KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION SURVEY OF COLLEGE 
STUDENTS ON SEXUAL ASSAULT, WASH. POST (2015)). 
 117 Diehl, supra note 113, at 508. 
 118 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92. 
 119 Id. at 1433. 
GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2016  12:58 PM 
442 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:415 
 
 
affirmatively.120 But the fact that young people in sexual relationships at 
some point talk about sex says very little about how any two people, 
strangers or familiars, communicate consent on a specific sexual 
occasion. The author similarly declares that foreplay often does not 
indicate willingness to have intercourse. Anderson reasons from studies 
indicating that women sometimes chose oral sex rather than intercourse 
to preserve “technical virginity,” that engaging in extensive foreplay is 
evidence of nonconsent: “The more diverse the sexual experiences 
people participate in . . . the less those experiences suggest consent to 
vaginal or anal penetration.”121 
Although intuition and marginally relevant surveys are familiar 
bases for affirmative consent proponents’ empirical conclusions, 
sociological literature on sexual consent performance appears less 
frequently. Sexuality Studies is a specialized field, and as in many 
developing areas of science, literature on sexual consent is in a state of 
development. But the studies make one thing clear: the typical way 
young people express sexual intent is precisely not by open verbal 
communication.122 Surveying the literature, sociologists Terry 
Humphreys and Mélanie Brousseau observe: “Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the preferred approach to signal consent for both 
women and men tends to be nonverbal instead of verbal.”123 While the 
science does indicate that people will be clearer as sexual contact 
becomes more intimate, agreement even to penetration is not likely to 
be a verbal ask-and-answer. Sexual consent signaling is, in fact, often 
entirely passive: “[M]any men and women passively indicate their 
consent to sexual intercourse by not resisting, such as allowing 
themselves to be undressed by their partner, not saying no, or not 
stopping their partner’s advances.”124 
 
 120 Id. (citing HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS AND 
YOUNG ADULTS: SEXUAL HEALTH KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES 19 tbl.13 (2003), 
http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/3218-index.cfm). 
 121 Anderson, supra note 92, at 1420 (citing Lisa Remez, Oral Sex Among Adolescents: Is It 
Sex or Is It Abstinence?, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 298, 298–301 (2000)). 
 122 Many of the studies do not claim to describe the dynamics of same-sex sexual 
communication. See Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 421. 
 123 Id. (citing studies); see also Terry P. Humphreys, Understanding Sexual Consent: An 
Empirical Investigation of the Normative Script for Young Heterosexual Adults, in MAKING 
SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 209 (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds., 2004); David S. Hall, 
Consent for Sexual Behavior in a College Student Population, 1 ELECTRONIC J. HUM. SEXUALITY, 
Aug. 10, 1998, http://www.ejhs.org/volume1/consent1.htm; Lucia F. O’Sullivan & E. Sandra 
Byers, College Students’ Incorporation of Initiator and Restrictor Roles in Sexual Dating 
Interactions, 29 J. SEX RES. 435 (1992). 
 124 See Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 421 (citing Hall, supra note 123). 
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The social science literature on sexual consent also reveals 
significant and troubling gender differentials, at least within the United 
States.125 Young people continue to adhere to “traditional” sexual scripts 
in which men initiate sex and women act as “gatekeepers.”126 Relatedly, 
studies document that women are keenly aware of the social costs of 
breaking from the traditional script and engaging in the “wrong” kind of 
sexual communication.127 It is thus not surprising that the phenomenon 
of token resistance, that is, communicating refusal when one is willing, 
continues to be part of the consent performance landscape.128 
B.     The Aspirational Argument: Affirmative Consent Is a Crucial 
Objective 
When faced with scant evidence that sexual communication is 
largely affirmative and unequivocal, affirmative consent proponents 
switch to aspirational claims that people should “play it safe” and openly 
negotiate consent.129 Broad affirmative consent laws and policies, the 
argument goes, will enable this behavioral shift.130 In making this case 
for strict affirmative consent laws, proponents take pains to point out 
the ubiquity of unconsensual sex—touting statistics like one-in-four/five 
college women experience sexual assault.131 The vacillation between 
 
 125 These differentials may not be so pronounced in other countries. See Sprecher et al., 
supra note 46, at 130. 
 126 Hickman & Muehlenhard, supra note 52, at 259 (citing studies); Annika M. Johnson & 
Stephanie M. Hoover, The Potential of Sexual Consent Interventions on College Campuses: A 
Literature Review on the Barriers to Establishing Affirmative Sexual Consent, 4 PURE INSIGHTS, 
2015, http://digitalcommons.wou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=pure (citing 
studies). 
 127 See Michael W. Wiederman, The Gendered Nature of Sexual Scripts, 13 FAM. J. 496 
(2005). 
 128 For a fascinating retrospective on the study of “token resistance,” see Charlene L. 
Muehlenhard, Examining Stereotypes About Token Resistance to Sex, 35 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 676 
(2011); see also Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No 
When They Mean Yes?, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (1988); O’Sullivan & Allgeier, 
supra note 46. 
 129 See, e.g., Jaclyn Friedman, Adults Hate ‘Yes Means Yes’ Laws. The College Students I Meet 
Love Them, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2015/10/14/adults-hate-affirmative-consent-laws-the-college-students-i-meet-love-them/?utm_
term=.80cb345897ed. 
 130 See, e.g., Little, supra note 104, at 1356 (analogizing affirmative consent to civil rights 
laws that “led popular culture”). 
 131 See, e.g., Morgan Baskin, Controversial 1-in-5 Sexual Assault Statistic Validated in New 
National Survey, USA TODAY C. (Sept. 21, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/
09/21/controversial-1-in-5-sexual-assault-statistic-validated-in-new-national-survey; Tara 
Culp-Ressler, Study Finds ‘Epidemic Level’ Of Rape On College Campus, THINKPROGRESS (May 
20, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2015/05/20/3661010/campus-rape-surveys; see also 
AAU Study, supra note 44 (one-in-four study); CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS 
 
GRUBER.38.2.1 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2016  12:58 PM 
444 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:415 
 
 
characterizing the young adult sexual world as one of enlightened 
consent communication and rampant unconsensual sex seems 
inescapably contradictory. 
Some reformers attempt escape by asserting that what accounts for 
the prevalence of unconsensual sex is not ordinary college boys—they 
stop and ask―but deviant “serial rapists” who hide behind lax 
disciplinary policies. Consider Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s comments: 
“These are not dates gone bad, or a good guy who had too much to 
drink. This is a crime largely perpetrated by repeat offenders, who 
instead of facing a prosecutor and a jail cell, remain on campus after a 
short-term suspension, if punished at all.”132 However, if aberrant 
offenders who force sex or clandestinely administer drugs are the 
problem, then there is little justification for requiring everyone to get a 
“yes.”133 Moreover, it appears that young men likely to engage in rape-
like behavior are not depraved recidivists, but rather the sexually 
uninitiated who eventually evolve,134 shedding light on why freshman 
year is the “red-zone.”135 
In any case, the idea is that law and policy should shift behavioral 
practices toward an edified sexual consent script, involving open 
negotiation, overt agreement, and double-checking frequently during 
the sexual encounter.136 Of course, “sex radical” commentators of both 
genders might regard this as quite a dystopian sexual world, and 
instinctively recoil at the notion that the government can use its carceral 
 
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/221153.pdf [hereinafter CSA STUDY] (one-in-five study). 
 132 Kirsten Gillibrand, We Will Not Allow These Crimes to Be Swept Under the Rug Any 
Longer, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/100144/kirsten-gillibrand-campus-sexual-
assault; see also Amanda Marcotte, Rape Victims Are Common. Rapists Are Not, SLATE (May 1, 
2014, 11:58 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/05/01/campus_sexual_assault_
statistics_so_many_victims_but_not_as_many_predators.html. 
 133 Most of these claims invoke a 2002 study. David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and 
Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73 (2002). That study 
has been heavily criticized, if not totally “debunked.” See Kevin M. Swartout et al., Trajectory 
Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 12 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1148 (2015) (discussing 
problematic aspects of the Lisak study); see also Lizzie Crocker, Is Sex Assault Coverage Really 
Sexist?, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 18, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/12/
18/is-sex-assault-coverage-really-sexist.html. 
 134 See Swartout et al., supra note 133. 
 135 See As Freshmen Enter ‘Red Zone,’ Colleges Re-Think Sexual Assault Policies, USA TODAY 
C. (Sept. 7, 2014, 9:36 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2014/09/07/a-freshmen-enter-red-
zone-colleges-re-think-sexual-assault-policies; Peter Jacobs, The ‘Red Zone’ Is A Shockingly 
Dangerous Time For Female College Freshmen, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/red-zone-shockingly-dangerous-female-college-freshmen-2014-7. 
The CSA STUDY, supra note 131, and AAU Study, supra note 44, also support this idea. 
 136 See Anderson, supra note 92; supra Sections II.D, II.E. 
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powers to violently stamp out sexual ambiguity.137 Nonetheless, many 
rightly regard the traditional sex script not as deliciously ambiguous, but 
troublingly gendered and harmful to women.138 Indeed, reading the 
sociological literature on sex negotiation leaves one more unsettled than 
reassured.139 Yet even those with a robust skepticism of current sexual 
culture (or even sex’s inherent value) are not likely to view as utopian a 
world of written sex contracts.140 On the other hand, less reformist 
proposals, like the MPC’s contextual consent, hardly please those who 
seek to “upend” traditional sex scripts.141 Perhaps there is an 
overlapping consensus on how ideal sexual consent should be 
performed, involving something like stop and ask or clear agreement. 
Critics often concede the wisdom of affirmative consent and agree 
that best sexual practices involve clear communication.142 Most 
thoughtful commentators rightly hope that sexual communication, 
sexual practices, and the repercussions of sex will change over time, 
such that harmful sex is reduced and the costs and benefits of sex are 
distributed more equally between men and women. The debate, 
however, is about whether criminal law (or even college discipline) is an 
appropriate tool of this cultural transformation.143 The more restrictive 
 
 137 See, e.g., Franke, supra note 73, at 206–07 (“[T]o evacuate women’s sexuality of any risk 
of a confrontation with shame, loss of control, or objectification strikes me as selling women a 
sanitized, meager simulacrum of sex not worth getting riled up about in any case.”); see also 
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 272 (“A world without ambiguity in erotic 
interaction might be a very dull place . . . .”). See generally Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 89 (2014). For a fascinating history illuminating the connection between 
feminist views of sexual violence and Republican politics, see Carole S. Vance, More Danger, 
More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 289, 
290 (1993). 
 138 See Franke, supra note 73, at 208; Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 14, at 635 & n.297 
(observing that affirmative consent envisions male sex proponents and fits in with existing 
gender expectations). 
 139 See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the nonverbal and highly 
gendered nature of consent negotiation). 
 140 Highly sex-restrictive aspirational visions, like the written contract, garner public 
ridicule. See Section II.A; see, e.g., thedavechannel, Sexual Consent Video, YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 
2007) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLhH1axWiTI. The video―created by and for men, 
it seems―means to ridicule the standard by portraying an in-bedroom negotiation with 
counsel. Id. But it actually seems like a pretty cool sex script (minus the legal fees). 
Interestingly, the woman negotiates both for progressive things (ten minutes of cunnilingus) 
and retrogressive things (meeting parents), illustrating the complexity of how women navigate 
gender roles, intimacy, and desire in sexual negotiation. Id. 
 141 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92, at 1411–21 (critiquing broad affirmative consent 
standards). 
 142 See, e.g., Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes’, TIME (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes (stating that 
“no one could oppose” affirmative consent’s goals of enthusiasm and mutual desire in sexual 
encounters). 
 143 See Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html?r=0. 
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the affirmative consent law, the greater the population subject to 
incarceration in the quest for cultural transformation. Certain 
affirmative consent proponents are candid that ordinary sexual actors 
will be sacrificial lambs in the larger cultural effort.144 Klein, for 
instance, opines: “The Yes Means Yes laws creates an equilibrium where 
too much counts as sexual assault. Bad as it is, that’s a necessary change. 
A culture where one-in-five women is assaulted isn’t going to be 
dislodged with a gentle nudge.”145 
One should, however, be wary of the “punitive impulse” to 
embrace criminalization as a preferred tool of social change.146 Experts 
note that because society reacts poorly to the widespread criminalization 
of ordinary behavior, laws that “shove” through change by radical 
behavioral prescriptions are less effective than laws that “nudge” a 
culture already at a tipping point.147 In fact, shoves may produce 
backlash and further entrench disfavored social practices. 
Correspondingly, one might put more stock in the broader affirmative 
consent standards than the narrow contract-type rules. Indeed, sexual 
communicative norms, especially among young people in their 
formative sexual years, are deeply psychological and socially 
entrenched.148 Such norms are likely to be “sticky” and resistant to 
change, even in the face of the prosecution of a selection of those who 
abide by the norms.149 
Indeed, experience shows that decision-makers will use discretion 
to temper the power conferred by broad criminal laws―a phenomenon 
we will return to in the distributional Section below. It bears mentioning 
at this point that such discretion may undercut the cultural evolutionary 
potential of affirmative consent laws. Our expansive criminal codes 
already outlaw many acts routinely performed by ordinary people (i.e., 
loitering and trespass). In mediating broad penal power, police and 
prosecutors tend to apply their authority in certain geographic areas and 
to certain people.150 In turn, the majority of citizens remain blissfully 
 
 144 See Klein, supra note 13; Little, supra note 104, at 1356; Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 
12, at 679 (“[U]sing criminal law to discredit harmful social norms can be fair and effective.”). 
 145 Klein, supra note 13. 
 146 See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your 
Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961 (2014). 
 147 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference 
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1805 (1992).  
 148 See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 149 See Kahan, supra note 147. In addition, the more artificial the script, the less likely it is 
that there will be widespread enforcement by officials. Id. 
 150 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999). 
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unaffected by the massive criminal regulatory regime because the 
negative effects of broad prosecutorial authority fall on a marginalized 
segment of society.151 If strict affirmative consent laws follow this 
familiar pattern, we might expect such sex regulation to apply in the 
manner criminal regulation typically applies―to the “usual suspects.” 
In turn, the rest of society will have little incentive to break from deeply 
embedded, psychologically entrenched sexual communicative 
practices.152 
In addition to the deterrence argument that affirmative consent 
laws will not change behavior, critics lodge the retributive objection that 
criminal law should not punish “innocents”―those who act within the 
current norm―in the quest to secure a culture of utopian, risk-
regulated, sexual communication.153 It is now prosaic for critics to claim 
that criminal law is “a blunt tool.” Indeed, publicity about mass 
incarceration and racialized policing has raised awareness of the 
extensive costs―human, social, and economic―of criminal regulation 
in particular. In response, defenders of affirmative consent set forth 
retributive and distributional arguments. The retributive argument 
denies that innocents are, in fact, sacrificed by the standard because 
those who have sex without affirmative consent are simply not innocent. 
The distributional argument, in direct contrast, does not deny that strict 
affirmative consent rules are facially overbroad but holds that, in 
practice, the rules will produce the right balance between convicting bad 
actors and preserving ordinary sexual practice. 
C.     The Retributive Argument: Affirmative Consent Is Morally 
Required 
The retributive argument is that people who fail to get positive 
permission for sex are morally culpable and should be subject to 
 
 151 See William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2012 (2008); Loïc 
Wacquant, Race as Civic Felony, 57 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 127, 128 (2005). As for all violent crimes, 
the proportion of blacks arrested for sexual offenses far exceeds the proportion of blacks in 
society. See Crime in the United States 2012, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/
2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
 152 Even if not discriminatorily applied, affirmative consent is unlikely to change norms. See 
Johnson & Hoover, supra note 126 (discussing studies indicating that directives on consent are 
ineffective because people interpret the term “consent” variably); Humphreys, supra note 123 
(noting that a decade of affirmative consent in Canadian criminal law has not changed the 
entrenched sexual script). 
 153 See Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-Type Defenses in 
the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 206 (1997); Douglas N. Husak & 
George C. Thomas III, Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and Reasonable Mistake, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 
86, 107 (2001). 
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punishment. When retributive concerns over just deserts are ascendant, 
other considerations like deterrence and mass incarceration fall by the 
wayside. The axiom that the guilty deserve punishment is rarely denied. 
The Supreme Court has held, for example, that even if the death penalty 
does not deter murders, states may decide that it is retributively 
warranted.154 Retribution is indeed an expansive theory that critics 
charge with enabling the hyper-punitive turn in American criminal 
law.155 Unreflectively invoking desert, they contend, can justify 
punishing anyone for anything. Proponents of affirmative consent 
advance two retributive claims about the standard’s fairness: First, it is 
fair to criminalize sex without affirmative consent so long as people 
have notice of the prohibition.156 Second, criminalization is warranted 
because sex without affirmative consent is morally wrongful behavior.157 
Affirmative consent proponents sometimes profess surprise that the 
standard provokes so much consternation, given how “easy” it is to 
comply with.158 The idea is that law and policy can tell young people to 
get a “yes,” and they will just do it.159 Nevertheless, the social science 
discussed above casts doubt on the ease of breaking with entrenched 
sexual practices and complying with aspirational norms. Indeed, open 
sexual communication comes at an emotional and psychological cost, 
and not just for women. Studies show that people of both 
sexes―especially young people―have strong incentive to eschew direct 
expression of sexual desire to avoid awkwardness and embarrassment 
and “save face” in the event of rejection.160 In addition, one might 
wonder why harsh criminal sanctions are necessary to compel people to 
do that which, according to proponents, is already easy to do. In any 
case, the notice given by various affirmative consent laws and policies is 
 
 154 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 155 See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
811, 812 (2002). 
 156 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 12, at 266 (stating that once the law 
announced the standard “it will be perfectly fair to punish anyone who disregards that 
standard”); Gill, supra note 35, at 62. 
 157 See, e.g., Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 238–39 (1989) 
(stating that a “communicative approach” to sex is “morally required”). 
 158 See, e.g., Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 671–72; Rebekah Kuschmider, Ask a 
Feminist: Affirmative Consent. What Is It?, HUFF. POST: IMPACT (Oct. 29, 2015, 3:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ravishly/ask-a-feminist-affirmative-consent-what-is-
it_b_8153606.html (“[Affirmative consent] can be easy, sexy, not awkward.”).  
 159 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 92, at 1433–34 (noting that extensive education will 
precede the rule); Gill, supra note 35, at 62 (asserting that affirmative consent might “decrease 
the risk of convicting innocent men by placing them on notice”); Schulhofer, Consent, supra 
note 12, at 671–72; Kuschmider, supra note 158 (“[affirmative consent] can be easy, sexy, not 
awkward.”).  
 160 Humphreys & Brousseau, supra note 52, at 422 (citing studies). 
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far from clear (hence, the need to categorize them), leaving many to 
wonder exactly what compliance entails.161 
Imagine, however, a law that clearly stated sex without a “verbal 
‘yes’” is a crime.162 For many theorists, there would remain the pressing 
question of whether the government should have the ability to declare 
such thing a crime. Indeed, one might set forth a constitutional 
argument under Lawrence v. Texas that punishing sex-without-a-yes 
constitutes regulation that infringes on people’s liberty to 
“control . . . their private sexual conduct.”163 In other words, in the quest 
to eliminate unwanted sex, strict affirmative consent standards 
criminalize a significant amount of wanted, consensual sex. Such sexual-
liberty restricting regulation is not necessarily saved by “a pattern of 
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults.”164 Affirmative 
consent advocates would probably respond that Lawrence declares a 
liberty interest only in consensual and harmless sex, and sex-without-a-
yes is unconsensual and harmful.165 Nevertheless, the more the 
affirmative consent standard strays from accepted behavioral practices 
(i.e., requiring a contract), the harder it is to maintain that those who 
violate it are invariably immoral and harmful actors.166 
Penal theorists, such as Professor Kim Ferzan, argue that the crux 
of wrongful sex is internal unwillingness, and defendants are culpable 
only when they intend a wrongful act (to impose unwanted sex).167 
While philosophers might vary on the precise mens rea required for 
culpability, most would agree that defendants who reasonably believe 
that sex is wanted are not culpable, regardless of whether they stopped, 
 
 161 See supra Part II. 
 162 While no law says this, certain university policies do. See supra notes 74–75 and 
accompanying text. 
 163 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 164 Id. at 559. Interestingly, the Lawrence opinion recognizes that one of the functions of 
anti-sodomy law was to punish “predatory acts against those who could not or did not 
consent.” Id. at 569. This would imply that a law infringing on sexual liberty is not necessarily 
rendered constitutional because it is enforced only in cases of clear harm. This balance of 
punishing the innocent and the government’s regulatory aim is typical of substantive due 
process cases. See Foster v. State, 286 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 1973) (holding that substantive due 
process prevented state from punishing the possession of a screwdriver as a burglary tool 
without proof that the screwdriver was used in a burglary). One possibility is that a yes-means-
yes standard might be constitutional, but only if applied to a case where there was also proof of 
actual nonconsent. 
 165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting the argument that having sex without 
express permission is a harm, regardless of whether the victim internally assented). 
 166 Schulhofer, for example, endorses a form of no-means-no standard, but asserts that the 
contract formula is “preposterous” and the argument for verbal consent is unpersuasive. 
Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 667. 
 167 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 397 (2016) [hereinafter Ferzan, Consent]. 
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asked, and received a “yes.”168 For the law to hold otherwise, they assert, 
is to criminally punish the non-culpable in an effort to satisfy some 
other regulatory aim, which is morally repugnant.169 While retributivist 
declarations about what is and is not culpable conduct can seem 
arbitrary,170 the particular concern that very strict affirmative consent 
laws punish innocents feels intuitively correct. Most people would scoff 
at the idea that two people who engage in mutually desired, 
communicative sex are both immoral actors because neither procured a 
contract or a verbal “yes.”171 
This retributivist concern leads some critics to argue that 
affirmative consent impermissibly makes rape a “strict liability” 
offense.172 In fact, affirmative consent laws and policies do not eliminate 
mens rea, but rather attach intent to the required external 
manifestations, instead of the complainant’s mental state.173 Thus, under 
a yes-means-yes standard, if “yes” is absent, defendants cannot argue 
that they reasonably believed the complainant wanted sex, and this does 
dispense with intent on internal willingness. However, the yes-means-
yes law is not formally a strict liability law so long as it requires the 
defendant to know (or have some intent) that the complainant did not 
say “yes.” Thus, reformers are correct to say that affirmative consent 
laws contain mens rea. This, however, does not explain why such mens 
rea establishes criminal culpability.174 A legislature might, for example, 
prohibit “sex during college” in an effort to curb unwanted sex and 
specify that the prosecution must prove175 that the defendant 
 
 168 See id. at 416; Husak & Thomas, supra note 153, at 107–08; supra Section I.C. 
 169 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply to Ayres and Baker, 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 637, 641 (2006) (critiquing proposed crime of first-time sex without a 
condom for being “overinclusive” and “punishing the morally innocent”). 
 170 See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 843 (2002). 
 171 Feminist commentators often assume the criminal prohibition against uncommunicative 
sex will be applied only to men. See, e.g., Pineau, supra note 157, at 239–40 (advocating 
criminalizing “a man [who] does not engage in communicative sexuality” to entrench a “norm 
of sex to which a reasonable woman would agree”). 
 172 See, e.g., Joseph J. Fischel, Per Se or Power? Age and Sexual Consent, 22 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 279, 325 (2010) (equating affirmative consent with “guilty until proven innocent”).  
 173 See, e.g., MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 52 (establishing a recklessness mens rea for lack 
of affirmative consent). 
 174 Ferzan argues that such affirmative consent standards are not formal strict liability, but 
that they are substantive strict liability because the standard does not attach to wrongful 
conduct. Ferzan, Consent, supra note 167, at 418 (citing Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict 
Criminal Liability Just, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1087 (1997)). 
 175 Critics of affirmative consent mistakenly argue that affirmative consent is burden 
shifting. See MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 68. It is not. Instead of having to prove 
unconsensual sex, the prosecution can prove something much easier, such as sex without a 
“yes.” Cf. Susan Dwyer, What a Difference ‘Yes’ Makes for Sex, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 6, 2015, 
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“knowingly” engaged in that behavior. Most would concede that having 
sex during college is not wrongful and those who do it knowingly are 
not criminally culpable.176 For many critics, narrow affirmative consent 
standards represent a similar overreach, even if they contain robust 
intent requirements. 
Nevertheless, some activists declare that it is morally wrong for 
men to fail to obtain affirmative consent because they participate in 
chauvinist culture.177 However, the same might be said of women who 
are sexually passive and engage in token resistance. We would think it 
outrageous to jail women for engaging in this “rape-permissive” 
behavior.178 One might claim that the difference is that men who do not 
obtain a “yes” impose unwanted sex on their victims, whereas women 
who perform token resistance do not harm anyone, except perhaps 
women in general. Yet this is only true if the lack of a “yes” is 
coextensive with internal unwillingness, which it is not.179 Thus, if men 
who do not get a “yes” are culpable for maintaining bad sexual culture 
when they could “easily” do otherwise, women are similarly culpable for 
engaging in token resistance when they could “easily” say what they 
want.180 
More persuasive is the argument that sex without affirmative 
consent, although not immoral in itself, is culpably risky (of producing 
unwanted sex). In this view, such sex is like speeding or drunk driving: 
law can regulate the risky behavior itself and hold defendants 
responsible when the behavior produces harm, even relatively 
unforeseeable harm.181 As an initial matter, it is a bit surreal to hear 
liberal criminal law theorists tout reduction of risk―unquantified 
 
2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/campus-sexual-
assaultaffirmativeconsent.html (applauding affirmative consent for “shift[ing] the burden”). 
 176 And it would likely be subject to constitutional challenge. See supra notes 163–64 and 
accompanying text (discussing Lawrence's prohibition of criminalizing consensual sex). 
 177 See, e.g., Pineau, supra note 157. 
 178 But see Little, supra note 104, at 1348 (advocating affirmative consent as a “model of 
sexual interaction where both participants take responsibilities for their desires and actions”). 
 179 See, e.g., supra Section I.B. 
 180 Indeed, culture changing programs target men and women. See Tovia Smith, Colleges 
Straddle Line Between Assault Prevention and Victim-Blaming, NPR (Nov. 21, 2014, 4:17 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/11/21/365460145/colleges-straddle-line-between-assault-prevention-
and-victim-blaming. Radical feminists might simply grant women immunity for participating 
in sexist culture, considering such participation a product of male domination, but rape 
reformers rarely openly articulate such a “female supremacist” view. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT 
DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 72 (2006). 
 181 See MPC Draft 5, supra note 10, at 70 (comparing no means no to drunk driving laws). 
We might question whether criminal risk regulation is warranted in the driving context. 
Theorists struggle with, for example, DUI manslaughter laws or whether negligence per se 
should apply in vehicular homicide cases. 
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risk―as a basis for criminal liability.182 Moreover, the dangerous 
sex/dangerous driving analogy creates more questions than answers 
about affirmative consent. Any sex risks unwanted sex, just as any 
driving risks an accident, and the question is when risk warrants 
regulation. Is sex-without-a-yes like driving fifty or ninety miles per 
hour? Is failing to stop-and-ask like driving with a .04 or a .09 blood 
alcohol level? Who gets to draw the line? Risky sex is no longer a matter 
of the defendant’s (or even reasonable person’s) awareness of a 
probability that the complainant is unwilling, but rather a matter of 
violating a bright line based on some independent risk calculation. 
Culpability is accordingly a function of distribution. This rule-like 
negligence dictates that people deserve punishment, not when they are 
subjectively reckless or even socially unreasonable, but when they 
transgress a regulatory rule based on some external balance of sex risks 
and rewards.183 This calculation is inevitably a function of one’s beliefs 
as to how risky sex without affirmative consent is and the value of the 
sex that is repressed.184 
D.     The Distributional Argument: Affirmative Consent Produces 
Distributive Justice 
The final set of arguments in favor of affirmative consent are not 
formalist like retributivist arguments, but are legal realist in nature: they 
defend the standard by asserting that the law “in action” does not 
criminalize ordinary sex; rather, it pushes back on the under-
prosecution of clearly unacceptable sex. As an initial matter, it is 
certainly worthwhile to try to trace or predict the winners and losers of 
any given legal regime or recommended reform. Indeed, I and others 
have touted “distributional analysis” as a preferred method of engaging 
 
 182 Perhaps the prominence of the risk reduction argument is a function of recent public-
healthizing of the sexual assault discussion by federal bureaucrats and college administrators. 
But given that age, drunkenness, and other factors are as (or perhaps more) predictive of 
unwanted sex than the utterance of “yes,” public health programs target a range of behaviors 
and include things like abstinence, gender segregation, and party prevention. See Gersen & Suk, 
supra note 43, at 912–16 (discussing such public health initiatives). 
 183 See Kelman, supra note 54, at 610. 
 184 Regulations are often based on some calculus of the likelihood that the activity 
(manufacturing, securities trading, labor practices, etc.) performed at a certain “level” will cause 
harm versus how reducing that “level” might affect the activity’s beneficial effects. See Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
1661, 1667–71 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002). Does sex without “affirmative 
consent” significantly increase the risk of unwanted sex? If it does, who gets to decide the value 
of the foregone sex? 
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in progressive legal lawmaking.185 Too often, reformers simply assume 
that their proposals will operate in the manner they envision in their 
minds. Advocates can be so wedded to these visions that they argue for 
their programs by contrasting the status quo with what is ideal rather 
than what is possible.186 Consequently, the impetus of rape reformers to 
determine what consent laws are out there, how they are being used, and 
who they are being used for and against, is a very positive development 
in rape theorizing.187 
Having said that, it bears noting that most proponents’ law-on-the-
ground analyses are less about showing that the affirmative consent 
standard produces good results than about defending it against critics’ 
gloom-and-doom predictions that the standard will widely punish 
ordinary sexual actors.188 As a result, those making distributional 
arguments have already determined that affirmative consent is 
warranted―probably for reasons cited above―and set out to show that 
it will not lead to jailing people who have sex without getting the magic 
words. 
Affirmative consent critics decry the risk that a willing sexual 
partner will report rape, for whatever reason, and unless there was a 
“yes,” the accused is guilty.189 Advocates respond that this vision of a 
world full of vindictive or unreasonable complainants utilizing broad 
affirmative consent standards to punish ordinary sexual actors is 
nothing more than men’s persistent “nightmare.”190 Reformers rightly 
assert that fears of vengeful women lying about rape are greatly 
exaggerated.191 However, advocates go further and argue that critics’ 
 
 185 See Aya Gruber, When Theory Met Practice: Distributional Analysis in Critical Criminal 
Law Theorizing, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3211 (2015) [hereinafter Gruber, Theory]; Janet Halley et 
al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex 
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 335, 405 (2006) (describing “distributively focused legal analysis”). 
 186 See Gruber, Theory, supra note 185, at 3229–30; Halley et al., supra note 185, at 336. 
 187 See, e.g., Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the 
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 979 (2008) (considering how a 
specialized “sex crimes” court might distribute costs and benefits across different classes); 
Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25. 
 188 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at 446–47. 
 189 See Dwyer, supra note 175 (describing this view); see also Marnie Eisenstadt, ‘Yes Means 
Yes’ will Lead to False Claims of Sexual Assault, Male Student Advocate Says, SYRACUSE.COM 
(July 15, 2015, 1:03 PM), http://www.syracuse.com/state/index.ssf/2015/07/yes_means_yes_
will_lead_to_false_claims_of_sexual_assault_male_student_advocate.html; Scott Greer, 
Opinion, Campus Rape Hysteria Has No Use for Due Process, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 14, 2015, 
1:27 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2015/09/14/campus-rape-hysteria-has-no-use-for-due-
process/#ixzz40RwvaDYD. 
 190 See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986); Little, supra note 104, at 1357 
(describing the “[b]ogeyman of the [f]alse [a]ccusation”). 
 191 See Gruber, Rape, Feminism, supra note 14, at 597–98, 598 n.84 (discussing competing 
statistics); see also Dwyer, supra note 175 (calling this a “morally repulsive assumption”). 
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fears are misplaced because affirmative consent standards will not lead 
victims to file reports in ambiguous, fraught, or contestable consent 
cases, and if they do, police, prosecutors, and college investigators will 
not pursue them.192 
This argument is somewhat strange, given that it rationalizes 
affirmative consent laws on the ground that they will not be followed. 
And it seems to conflict with the justification that the reform increases 
reporting and controls recalcitrant police and prosecutors. Accordingly, 
the pro-affirmative consent distributional argument must say something 
more like this: the standard will increase the right kind of reporting and 
prosecutions. In the status quo (non-affirmative consent world), the 
argument goes, women fail to report even forcible and clearly 
unconsensual rapes because of embarrassment, fear, traumatization, or 
other structural barriers. Police and prosecutors decline to pursue all 
types of rape cases because of prejudice or concern over obtaining a 
conviction in a he said, she said situation. Juries acquit because of error 
or prejudice.193 Affirmative consent standards will encourage these 
victims to report, these police and prosecutors to pursue cases, and these 
juries to convict. The net result is more frequent prosecution and 
conviction in clearly harmful, but not contestable, cases. 
Will affirmative consent work out this way? We simply do not 
have—and probably will never get—empirical evidence on how 
affirmative consent affects reporting in uncontroversial versus 
contestable rape cases. It is worth noting, however, that forcible 
intercourse and clearly unconsensual sex are already fully criminalized 
without affirmative consent. Victims fail to report such rapes because of 
structural barriers, not lack of criminalization, and they would face such 
barriers regardless of an affirmative consent law.194 An affirmative 
consent law is therefore likely to affect a different class of potential 
reporters: those who experience more ambiguous sexual assaults, like 
cases involving “miscommunication,”195 and think they are not crimes. 
Indeed, studies reveal that victims often do not report such assaults 
because they do not see them as “rapes” or regard them as serious 
enough to report. Affirmative consent laws may have the effect of 
 
 192 See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25 (asserting that fears about 
“miscommunication” cases are overblown). 
 193 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 194 As it is, the existence of “stereotypical” rape attributes like physical force and injury are 
the best predictors of when a rape will be reported. See Ronet Bachman, The Factors Related to 
Rape Reporting Behavior and Arrest: New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization 
Survey, 25 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 8, 20, 22 tbl.2 (1998). 
 195 See Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part I (describing an array of 
concerns over miscommunication). 
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persuading such victims and/or the people they consult with that sex 
without affirmative consent is serious enough to report. The 
conversation might go something like this: 
 
A: “I’m not sure I should report this. We were both pretty drunk, 
and I didn’t say to stop. But I just don’t feel right.” 
 
A’s Best Friend: “B did not stop and ask your permission. You did 
not say yes. That is rape, and you should report it.” 
 
Encouragement increases reporting, so let us assume A decides to 
report.196 This is obviously a great result for affirmative consent 
proponents who want to increase reporting in cases of ambiguous 
consent.197 However, it runs directly counter to the contention that 
affirmative consent will not increase the prosecution of 
miscommunication cases. Indeed, affirmative consent is linked to 
reporting because it signals to victims that they will be believed, will not 
be “put on trial,” and will obtain a favorable outcome. However, this 
incentive structure applies with equal force to victims in clear and 
ambiguous cases alike.198  
Some suggest that prosecutors will use their discretion to weed out 
fraught reports. Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer, for example, 
canvassed published appellate decisions in “affirmative consent 
jurisdictions”199 and found that the term affirmative consent cropped 
up, not in miscommunication or contested consent situations, but in 
incidents involving force, intoxication, and unconsciousness.200 The 
cases went like this: The prosecution argued that the victim was 
asleep/incapacitated/deathly afraid. The defendant argued that the 
victim was not and, in fact, consented. The court upheld the conviction 
because the jury could find that the victim was 
 
 196 See Lisa A. Paul et al., Does Encouragement by Others Increase Rape Reporting? Findings 
from a National Sample of Women, 38 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 222 (2013). But see Bryden, 
Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 422 (postulating that affirmative consent would not greatly 
increase reporting in general because of social norms). 
 197 Of course, there is reason to wonder whether feminist reformers would want this if we 
imagine A as a male and B as a female. See supra note 37. 
 198 Cf. Ashe Schow, Student Newspaper Just Fine with False Accusations, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Oct. 22, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/student-newspaper-just-fine-
with-false-accusations/article/2574703 (discussing student newspaper’s claim that false 
accusation is a justified cost of increased reporting). 
 199 Tuerkheimer included all jurisdictions whose rape statutes plausibly required 
performative consent. Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part III. 
 200 See David P. Bryden, Reason and Guesswork in the Definition of Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 585, 591 (2000) [hereinafter Bryden, Reason and Guesswork] (noting the “danger” that 
affirmative consent will lower the burden of proof in more serious cases). 
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asleep/incapacitated/deathly afraid and, therefore, did not "affirmatively 
consent."201 Tuerkheimer’s study, thus, indicates that affirmative 
consent exerts little influence on miscommunication cases and rape 
prosecution in general. The author reasons that this lack of influence 
may be due to prosecutors’ refusal to bring “gray zone” cases.202 
It may be that prosecutors in affirmative consent jurisdictions do 
not pursue difficult miscommunication cases. One must, however, 
exercise caution in drawing conclusions from the sparse evidence in 
published appellate decisions. In affirmative consent jurisdictions, the 
few appeals all involve “traditional” rape scenarios, but this may just 
mean that the miscommunication cases pled out or were not appealed. 
The appellate case analysis simply does not speak to the types of rapes 
prosecuted but not appealed and why prosecutors pursed them. That 
said, if it is true that prosecutors weed out the “gray” cases affirmative 
consent law could address, one is left to wonder exactly what the reform 
does. The law’s aim is evidently to encourage prosecutors to pursue 
cases they otherwise might not―cases provable under affirmative 
consent but not weaker rape laws.203 However, one can only speculate 
on whether this happens. 
So let me engage in some brief speculation. Assume that a 
jurisdiction makes it a low level felony to have sex without stopping and 
asking permission. What will happen with this newfound prosecutorial 
power? One possibility is that it will operate how prosecutorial power 
often does―compelling defendants in close cases to forego trial and 
plead guilty. Thus, if evidence of force, coercion, or intoxication is weak, 
the prosecution will threaten the affirmative consent law to induce a 
plea.204 Whether this is good or bad depends on whether one thinks that 
prosecutors are currently too stingy with force, coercion, and 
intoxication prosecutions and whether the evidentiary threshold in such 
cases is too high.205 In diametric opposition to this scenario, some 
 
 201 Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at Part II. 
 202 Id. at 467. 
 203 See Diehl, supra note 113, at 507 (asserting that prosecutors have a duty to strictly 
enforce affirmative consent to educate an “unaware” society about the “distinction between 
rape, consent, and acceptable sexual behavior”). 
 204 Prosecutors can also take weak force or intoxication cases to trial, with lack of affirmative 
consent as a fall back. 
 205 Compare Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 25, at 447 n.27 (prosecutors 
bringing more cases would be “a positive feature of affirmative consent, particularly given that 
rape law is significantly underenforced”), and Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 12, at 670–71 
(asserting that performative consent is necessary to address intoxication and subtle coercion), 
with Bryden, Redefining Rape, supra note 61, at 408 (“To use an affirmative-consent law mainly 
to solve proof problems, when the prosecutor believes, but perhaps cannot prove, that the 
defendant is guilty of a more serious crime, would be troubling.” (footnote omitted)). 
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hypothesize that focusing prosecutors and jurors on consent 
performance will make them less likely to prosecute and convict in cases 
of subtle coercion where victims appear to agree.206 
The second possibility is that prosecutors will use the new 
authority to pursue a subset of miscommunication cases. Charges may 
arise when the prosecutor instinctively views the defendant as a true 
criminal (not a regular guy), when the prosecutor regards the victim as 
“credible,” or when the victim is vehement. These discretionary 
prosecutions might meaningfully overlap with the type of cases scholars 
think should be brought, but they might not. Prosecutors’ views of true 
criminality may be influenced more by racial and socioeconomic 
characteristics than by the nature of the sexual event.207 Similarly, 
assessments of victims’ credibility may involve race, class, or gender 
stereotyping. Moreover, the most vehement victims may also be the 
most biased and unbelievable.208 It is true that these are problems of 
prosecutorial discretion in general, not just affirmative consent 
prosecutions; however, rape reformers do not get a “free pass” to write 
off the problems of the U.S. carceral system, especially when investing 
state actors with broad discretionary power. 
In the end, it is difficult to predict how the burdens and benefits of 
affirmative consent rules will distribute.209 Affirmative consent 
proponents have faith that broad proposals will lead to increased 
prosecution of “clear” (not miscommunication) cases and eventually 
produce a yes-means-yes culture, without the cost of punishing those 
who act within the norms of prevailing sexual culture. But “faith” is the 
correct word here because there is no particular reason to believe that 
this is how things will play out. In any case, the fact is that affirmative 
consent laws say that lack-of-affirmative-consent cases are “clear” cases. 
Consequently, while all thoughtful law reformers should endeavor to 
 
 206 See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1005 
(1998) (noting the argument that focusing on the complainant’s consent can deflect from a 
focus on the coercive means used by the defendant to procure sex). 
 207 See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial 
Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 360 (2009); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, 
Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1811, 1815, 1819–20 (1998) (both discussing race and prosecutorial discretion in capital 
punishment); see also Bryden, Reason and Guesswork, supra note 200, at 591 (postulating that 
affirmative consent might lead to discriminatory enforcement). 
 208 See Lynne Henderson, Commentary, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim’s Rights 
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 584 (1998) (“‘Victims’ are ‘blameless,’ innocent, 
usually attractive, middle class, and white.”). 
 209 See Richard Pérez-Peña & Ian Lovett, California Law on Sexual Consent Pleases Many but 
Leaves Some Doubters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/us/
california-law-on-sex-consent-pleases-many-but-leaves-some-doubters.html?_r=1 (noting that 
universities applying California’s law “are hampered by a lack of hard data about what works” 
and thus “rely on instinct and anecdote”). 
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determine if their reform does what it says, affirmative consent 
proponents are in the strange position of speculating on the effects of 
the rule, despite what it says.210 
CONCLUSION 
My hope is that the reader now better understands what policy 
makers and public intellectuals mean when they tout or reject 
“affirmative consent” and the types of arguments and counterarguments 
that follow. This understanding is critical at a moment when the debate 
over rape law, on each side of the political fence, has a say-anything-for-
the-sake-of-argument feel. This Article also sheds a skeptical light on 
scholars’ relative consensus that consent is the best framework for rape 
law. In other areas of rape law, policy makers lay out and debate the 
specific types of circumstances that render sex criminal: age 
combinations, types of extortion, nature of promises, fiduciary 
relationships, categories of force, etc. And then there is consent. 
Consent ends up playing the role of a catchall, permitting rape 
prosecutions in the areas where the law fails to articulate the specific 
unacceptable conditions of sex. But its liberal construct has prevented 
meaningful dialogue on the exact sexual interactions rape-consent laws 
should catch. Reformers maintain that, left to its own devices, consent 
did not catch enough criminal behavior. But rather than abandoning the 
consent framework, they turned to affirmative consent, which 
purported to build a better consent mousetrap and thereby vindicate 
“sexual autonomy.” Situating affirmative consent reform as a mere 
means to improving the liberal consent inquiry has obscured the very 
motivations behind expanding the catch-all—the empirical and 
normative beliefs about how sex happens, how it should happen, the 
benefits and harms of sex, and the role of criminal law in regulating 
sexuality. This Article brought those claims into the open, where they 
should be, as a preface to a clear, communicative, and unambiguous 
negotiation over the content of rape law.211 
 
 210 But see Diehl, supra note 113, at 507 (urging prosecutors to use affirmative consent to 
prosecute ambiguous cases). 
 211 Recently, I was speaking to a student about an affirmative consent paper topic. She said: 
“I want to argue that affirmative consent is a straightforward standard from contract law that 
simply requires agreement.” So I asked her what actions or communications would constitute 
such agreement. Concerned, she replied: “If I were to get into that I’d have to talk about sex.” 
